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Steens Mountain is located in the southeast comer of the Oregon High Desert, at the 
northern edge o f the Great Basin. The mountain is a place o f exceptional ecological 
diversity—a “sky island” that is home to rare, endangered, and endemic flora and fauna 
as well as approximately 18,000 head o f cattle and thirty-five ranchers. Recently 
designated as the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Area, it 
stands in contrast to the many national monuments declared by former President Clinton 
during the last years o f his presidency.
In August 1999, former Interior Secretary Bmce Babbitt visited Steens Mountain to 
settle the long-standing question of special designation. Instead of calling for 
administrative protection, Babbitt indicated that he would support legislation that would 
protect the mountain, designated through congressional action and local involvement. 
However, Secretary Babbitt also stated that if the legislative effort proved unsuccessful, 
he would recommend national monument designation through an executive order. This 
explicit threat set the wheels in motion for collaboration and intense negotiations between 
locals, environmentalists, state and federal government officials, and ranchers. It 
ultimately resulted in a legislative solution that many see as a new model for solving land 
management conflicts in the West.
This is the first agreement o f its kind. The results include the first legislated cattle-free 
wilderness area; land exchanges that help consolidate and protect the fragile, alpine areas 
on the mountain; the maintenance o f economically viable ranches in the low country; and 
the establishment o f a diverse citizens’ advisory committee that will assist the BLM in 
managing the mountain—among other precedent-setting acts.
Committee Chair: Donald Snow
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Mountain Lure
More than any other American place I know, this desert comer bespeaks change, the 
subtle changes sometimes a mask for grand upheavals.
-W illiam Least Heat Moon, “Oregon’s Outback”
A deep autumn chill accompanied the fading light. I sat within the screened 
porch of the ranch bunkhouse, a well-used, worn building— its white paint chipped and 
peeling to reveal a weathered gray. Though I had stripped to a tank top while hiking only 
hours earlier that day, thin triangles of ice began to coalesce in the dog’s water bowl. 
Unworried mule deer grazed within my touch. They gathered on the refuge for safety 
during the hunting season. Their oversized ears flicked back and forth at the sounds of 
night settling—a barn owl, coyote, or distant diesel truck kicking up gravel on a solitary 
desert road.
In an hour, I would sleep in this little bunkhouse at the southern end of the 
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. My hosts, Alice and Cal Elshoff, were caretakers o f 
the recently acquired property, a ranch they had lobbied for and helped procure the funds 
for the refuge to purchase. They graciously offered me the building during my week of 
research. A wood stove was welcome warmth; the night before I had slept cocooned in a 
down sleeping bag in the back o f my truck while the temperature hovered in the teens.
I had returned to this desert comer in southeastern Oregon in early October of 
2000 to research the ongoing political changes at Steens Mountain—changes that evolved 
almost too quickly for me to track them. They would ultimately result in unique 
legislation passed by the House of Representatives on October 4th o f2000, the Senate on 
October 12th, and signed into law by President Clinton on October 30th. The bill was
l
bom o f bipartisan cooperation as well as the involvement of local ranchers and 
environmentalists. It designates the 425,550-acre Steens Mountain Cooperative 
Management and Protection Area; involves ecologically and economically important land 
trades between ranchers and the federal government; establishes the first legislatively 
created cattle-free wilderness area; promotes a cooperative grazing agreement with 
ranchers; and a creates a reserve for the endemic redband trout—among other precedent- 
setting acts. But, on that deepening October night, as I prepared to sleep on the marshy 
wildlife refuge that lay below the mountain, I had no idea if H.R. 4828, at that time under 
consideration in the House, would be severely altered, stalled, or killed. I had no idea if 
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt would fulfill his threat and Steens Mountain would 
instead become a national monument through executive action.
The sun slipped away under a volcanic bluff, and the stars began feasting on a 
plum-wine sky. The subtle, slow changes required patient observation. Despite the cold,
I lingered on the porch awhile longer. Almost a year earlier, I had read about the conflict 
at Steens while trying to calm my nerves on a flight to Chicago. As the plane accelerated 
down the runway, I focused upon the unknown fate o f this virtually unknown mountain 
in my home state. Back on the ground, my curiosity held, and soon thereafter I began 
combing the newspapers and looking for more information on Steens Mountain.
Though I had previously visited the area in early March, the evening closed my 
first full snow-free day on the mountain. That morning, I decided to settle into the 
landscape rather than jump headfirst into a series of complex interviews with ranchers, 
environmentalists, and BLM staff. Alice Elshoff greeted me in her kitchen with coffee 
and muffins. A trim, athletic woman with a warm voice and bright eyes, she wore a
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Great Old Broads for Wilderness T-shirt. Her face was etched by the wind and sun o f the 
desert, where she had spent much of her life exploring. But aside from a mix o f gray in 
her dark hair, she did not betray her sixty-six years. Elshoff had plans to plant 
cottonwood and willow along an irrigation ditch on the refuge—improve it as habitat for 
redband trout. She had gathered together a few Forest Service scientists to look at 
different sites on Mud Creek, where she and a group o f volunteers might cut and clone 
the species. I came along for the ride and exercise.
We drove up the North Loop road, climbing the broad western side o f the 
mountain, a gentle slope of uplifted earth tilted towards a 9,700-foot summit. The sky 
was a polished slate o f blue on the absolutely cloudless morning. The land rolled in burnt 
summer grasses and sage and rabbitbrusfr—the desert colors. But, above us, flowing out 
o f gullies and-spilling across the desert were the aspen. Some had already shed their 
leaves and streaked the landscape with gray—edged by the shaipness o f their white, 
slender trunks. Others resembled a finger painting with smudges o f deep golden, fiery 
orange, and light tinges o f neon green as the leaves held onto late summer. They seemed 
an anomaly, such vibrant breaths in the high desert. We all fell silent watching the trees 
blur as we gained elevation and then accidentally sped past the unmarked two-track 
where we were supposed to hike down to an ephemeral tributary of Mud Creek. “Sorry,” 
Elshoff explained to the driver, “I was gawking at the aspens.”
Walking through such aspen glens in the fall is nothing but sensual. The soft light 
casting through the branches is seductive, and you can feel it comb through your hair and 
blow against the back of your neck. Deer bed down here, leaving their warm imprints in 
the dim grasses. Hawk nests adorn the crowns. Leaves twist and tremble on a light
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desert wind. Generations o f lovers have come here, carved initials and symbols in the 
milky trunks. The carvings scab with age and climb up the trunk as the trees grow—  
some are now too high to read. Some are simply unreadable, left from lonely Basque 
sheepherders who roamed the mountain with their herds at the beginning o f the century.
It seems odd, in such an open landscape, where the sky dominates every view, to 
be ducking and tripping, stepping aside for branches and weaving through a maze of 
bone-like trunks. The transition is sudden from the desert to the wet meadows and 
trees—as sudden as the cool air that latches onto you when you step out o f the burning 
sun and into the aspens clustering around springs or cottonwoods lining the mountain 
creeks. Part o f it has to do with the ecological diversity that comes with elevation change 
as the mountain catches rain clouds and holds snow almost year-round. Steens 
Mountain’s complex story stretches across a geologic timeline—volcanism, plate 
tectonics, uplift, and climate change. And though human habitation here is relatively 
recent in comparison, part of that ecological and geologic transition is also wrapped in 
our own species’ stories. Those aspen glades, meadows, and mountain gorges drew early 
white settlers, cattlemen, and sheepherders, and sustained the Northern Paiutes for 
thousands o f years beforehand.
A specific human story drew me to Steens, and, like many, the story arises from 
and is fought over a specific landscape. One simply might call it the classical cowboy 
versus environmentalist battle, but, in this case, it’s not that simple. All o f the players 
lined up for the fight, and though they hardly remain allies today, they’ve each walked 
away from the table somewhat satisfied as a result o f their negotiations and compromises. 
Politics, rhetoric, name-calling, and distrust were not left out of the story. A month after
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my fall visit to the Steens, after the bill had been signed by President Clinton, Andy Kerr, 
perhaps Oregon’s most famous environmentalist, bluntly explained that conservationists 
were able to win prizes such as 97,000 acres o f cattle-free wilderness because “we simply 
had more guns to their head.” But others, including politicians and their staffs, have 
touted the bill as an example o f cooperation, collaboration, and trust-—a precedent-setting 
model for natural resources conflicts. I eventually discovered that the deal had elements 
of trust and distrust as well as moments o f shrewd negotiation and an occasional 
enjoyable truce— such as when a couple o f environmentalists and ranchers leaned against 
a truck in the Catlow Valley and drank a few beers at the end of their bargaining day.
People talked to me for hours in the Great Basin. Everyone from BLM staff to 
“old family” ranchers to environmentalists would show me a natural hospitality, one that 
you perhaps cannot live without in such an empty place. They took time to tell me their 
stories, feed me, house me, and show me where to go on the mountain. And from them, 
as well as from those I talked to in Oregon’s metropolitan areas, I learned about the 
importance of the mountain, the specific people involved, the political process, and the 
drama o f negotiation.
From the bunkhouse porch, I could no longer see the distinct silhouette o f the 
Steens, stretched long and wide. I could only imagine its high, glacial gorges and its 
desert to the east, a creamy, barren playa, called the Alvord. I had not yet seen the 
mountain’s summit. Night’s transformation was complete, and then I could only listen.
In Blue Highways, William Least Heat Moon writes, “the desert does its best talking at 
night” (Least Heat Moon 1982). So I lingered.
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Basin and Range
Taut is the word that fits this country. The elasticity o f the earth’s crust seems palpable, 
the surface pulled tight until it gives way to the parallel fault blocks that create the bowls
of the basins and the ridges o f the ranges.
-Stephen Trimble, The Sagebrush Ocean: A Natural History o f the Great Basin.
Drive fifteen miles southeast of Bend, Oregon, on Highway 20 and you’ll find 
yourself lost in the Oregon High Desert. Glance in the rearview mirror and 10,000-foot 
volcanoes cloaked by glaciers fade into distance. Look ahead and there will be nothing 
but a long stretch o f highway, edged by telephone poles and makeshift fence posts, 
pushing through empty basins o f sage and rabbitbrush and bunch grasses. This is the 
northern comer of the Great Basin. Snow-dusted plateaus and gentle mountains rest on 
all horizons.
At the town of Bums, head south on Highway 205 towards Malheur National 
Wildlife Refuge. When you crest over a dry, rocky plateau, Malheur Lake will spread 
below you as if a part o f the sky has fallen upon the desert. Other ponds, lakes, and 
marshes are barely visible in the expanse. Only the light caught from the air 
distinguishes the water from the rich muddy tones o f the desert below. It looks like an 
impressionistic painting, as if the artist deliberately blurred the delineation o f land, 
mountains, clouds, sky.
Steens rises above the Blitzen River Valley, where cattle graze with sandhill 
cranes in fenced pastures. This fault-block mountain reaches 9,700 feet above sea level. 
It stretches north and south for almost sixty miles—from Riddle Mountain to Alvord 
Peak and Long Hollow—and east and west— from the Alvord Desert to the Blitzen and 
Catlow Valleys— for another forty. Viewed from the east, the Steens escarpment pushes
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5,500 feet out o f the Alvord Desert in less than three miles. On the west side, the valley 
bottoms are lost to sage and rangeland, or plowed into neat squares. The land slopes up 
gently towards broad plateaus, which darken with juniper and mountain mahogany.
Below one of these rises might rest a cluster o f small buildings: a house, a bam, a tin- 
roofed shed covering hay bales. The buildings are centered in geometric fields, twenty or 
forty miles apart from the next cluster.
The mountain belongs to the Northern Basin and Range province, and, as such, it 
is related more closely to the eco-regions found in Nevada than in western Oregon. 
According to the Bureau o f Land Management’s Steens Mountain Resources handbook, 
this geomorphic province contains a series o f nearly parallel, generally north-trending, 
fault block mountains separated by broad valleys (BLM 1999). The area is bounded by 
the Sierra Nevada on the west, the Rocky Mountains and Colorado River drainage on the 
east, the Snake River Plain on the north, and pierces the Salton Trough of northern Baja 
California at its southern tip. Though the region is given different hydrographic, 
physiographic, historic, and biogeographic definitions, perhaps the easiest way to define 
the Great Basin is, as Stephen Trimble does in The Sagebrush Ocean: “the piece o f the 
West that drains inward” (Trimble 1989). Each creek that flows from a mountain leads to 
a closed basin; some collect in low-lying marshes or lakes. Most drainage areas descend 
to vast alkali playas, ephemeral lakes, and desert. There is no outlet to the sea.
Yet the basin and range topography rises and falls like waves rolling onto a beach. 
Basin and range. Basin and range. One after another. “Mountain ranges alternate with 
desert basins in lilting rhythm. Their magnitudes are equal,” writes Trimble. “One to 
one, basin to range.”
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The basin and range faulting that produced Steens began approximately eighteen 
million years ago during the Miocene period—characterized by regional, east to west 
arching and stretching of the earth’s crusts, which still continues today. At about sixteen 
million years ago, faulting was accompanied by large volume volcanic flows o f basaltic 
lava, now called Steens basalt. The flows formed an elongated, low shield volcano— a 
gently sloping mound constructed by countless fluid basaltic flows that erupted without 
explosions. It was centered near the precipitous escarpment rising out o f the Alvord. 
Basalt flows extended from Abert Rim, sixty miles to the west, to the Santa Rosa Range 
o f Nevada.
You don’t have to be a geologist to recognize that Steens is a result o f uplift. 
Stand in the desert and stare long enough at the mountain, and the entire fault block will 
appear to heave itself heavenward. Less than a million years ago, uplift o f Steens 
Mountain created high enough elevations for the formation o f alpine glaciers. And 
between 24,000 and 12,000 years ago, the Alvord Valley was actually a large lake—a 
result o f warmer temperatures and increased precipitation that accompanied a climate 
change, which occurred several thousand years after the glaciers on Steens peaked. Lake 
Alvord began to dry up 11,000 years ago, and the glaciers did likewise, 9,000 years ago. 
The Alvord Valley contains a layer o f sediment almost 1,000 feet thick—eroded from the 
Steens escarpment (BLM 1999; Brown 2000). That process o f erosion continues, as it 
does to other mountains and ridges throughout the region: basins fill and drop as 
mountains are pushed up and fall away.
Those two major geologic processes—volcanic eruptions and tectonic faulting 
and stretching—together with the warmer Pleistocene climate changes that produced
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glaciation and pluvial lake formation, account for the 5,500-foot escarpment on Steens’ 
east face, the broad sweep o f the Alvord Valley, as well as hanging valleys and 2,000- 
foot deep glacial gorges on the mountain. The glaciers scraped away the earth and dug 
trenches about half-a-mile deep, exposing basalt (Brown 2000; BLM 1999). Steens is 
defined by four o f these U-shaped gorges—Kiger, Little Blitzen, Big Indian, and 
Wildhorse—which are visible from the west and north sides o f the mountain.
When I visited for my first round of interviews in early March o f 2000, Stacy 
Davies drove me to a viewpoint o f the mountain on the South Loop Road. He looked the 
classic cowboy in slim-fitting Wranglers: wiry and taut, clean shaven, with pale blue 
eyes. Davies is the ranch manager for Roaring Springs Ranch, the biggest on the 
mountain, with (before the enactment o f the legislation and land trades) 146,000 acres of 
private land and 250,000 acres o f BLM leases. Because o f its size and location in the 
Catlow Valley, right on Highway 205, Roaring Springs became a focal point in the 
politics o f special designation o f the mountain. Everyone—ranchers, BLM staff, even 
environmentalists—told me that the owners were lucky to have Stacy Davies.
We stepped out o f his truck when the road became blocked by snow, and he 
directed my eyes to the ridgeline.
“Little Indian and Big Indian Gorges come together right at the base o f the 
mountain,” he said. “This is Little Blitzen further to the left, and it kind o f curls around 
here. And then Kiger Gorge is on the north side. It runs straight north. Wild Horse runs 
straight south, and they all come to a point right up there on the high Steens.” I followed 
the trace of his hands.
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Davies pointed out the famous notch in the east ridge o f Kiger Gorge. “Clear on 
down the skyline, to the left, is Kiger Gorge. You can see the ridge on the opposite side 
o f the gorge, and the gunsight, where the mountain goes down like that in the distance.” 
The notch or gunsight formed during a later glaciation when a smaller glacier in Mann 
Creek Canyon eroded through the ridgetop.
Snow demarcated changes in elevation—a thin layer as it sloped towards the 
north, while the western and southern parts o f the mountain were blanketed almost to the 
rim we stood on. From this angle, Steens resembled a rectangular plateau more than a 
mountain. It looked unfinished, like a block o f wet clay that bore only the first, broad 
cuts o f a palette knife—the essential shape, before hours o f detailed sculpting and 
smoothing. The clouds mimicked the mountain, shoved up against it and stretched out 
long against the flat sky. I thought o f a topographic map and imagined an arc o f line 
sweeping out in a lobe from the gorges. We stood within the line, actually on the 
mountain itself, about ten miles from the Catlow Rim. But the uplift before us seemed 
disjointed, an entirely different piece o f land.
“You have traveled across the West a substantial amount,” Davies said. He 
shoved his thumbs in his pockets and shifted his eyes away from the mountain and 
towards me. I leaned against his worn diesel truck and nodded yes. “There’s a lot of 
land that looks like this,” he asserted and swept the back o f his hand across the landscape, 
pointing out juniper, sagebrush, and rocky desert hills. “There really is,” he continued. 
“But that up there,” Davies nodded at the big, snowy hulk, stretched like a wing to the 
north. “There’s probably only three places in the world just like that.”
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Steens Mountain did look like an apparition—carving its own space into that of 
the Oregon High Desert. As I stood there with Davies, the mountain loomed as an oasis 
o f biodiversity, presiding over Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, an island o f lakes and 
marshes, habitat for migratory birds, in a sea o f sunburnt bluffs, plateaus, and sage. I had 
to agree.
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Frenchglen
Next in importance to the divine profusion o f water, light, and air, those three physical 
facts which render existence possible, may be reckoned the universal 
beneficence o f grass. — Senator John J. Ingalls
Harney County is larger than most New England states: 143 miles long and 86.6 
miles wide. The population in 1996 was estimated to be 7,500 people. Bums is the 
largest town at 2,935 people. Stacey Davies’ six children make up about half o f 
Frenchglen School’s students. Of the 3,210 jobs listed in 1996,970 were in the 
government sector and 470 were in the farm sector (BLM 1999). These statistics, though 
obviously relevant, do not quite paint a picture o f the landscape and how these people fit 
into it.
Outside o f Bums, there are no services on Highway 205 for over 70 miles. Visit 
in winter or spring, and you won’t see many tourists. You’ll drive through vast basins 
filled with lakes in flood, reeds and bunchgrasses, waterbirds, red-winged blackbirds, 
cranes, swans, pelicans, and scattered herds o f mule deer. A lone truck might pass on the 
highway, and a rancher will raise his index finger from the steering wheel as greeting. 
You’ll feel it’s rude not to reciprocate. Further on, you’ll have to slow down for a 
cowboy herding steers along the road with his eager cattle dogs. Frenchglen is little more 
than a cafe, a general store, and a bend in the highway. The hotel there was built around 
1916 as a stopping place for teamsters, who were needed to help the freight teams get up 
the hill (now a paved 15% grade) to the Catlow Valley on their way to Winnemucca, 
Nevada.
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In 1994, livestock production in Hamey County generated around $22.8 million 
in sales. BLM forage (grazing allotments) for beef production accounted for 
approximately thirty-five percent o f total forage (BLM 1999).
“The only reason these guys are out there is because livestock were on these lands 
prior to laws being enacted—it was open range at the time o f settlement,” Bill Marlett, 
executive director o f the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA), asserted during a 
conversation in Bend, Oregon. “It’s only by default that they have an institutional 
presence on these landscapes. If you were to ask the question today, assuming there was 
no grazing on public lands, and say, ‘Well, do we want to start a public lands grazing 
program in the West?’—that wouldn’t go anywhere. There’s no way we’d be grazing on 
the public lands if the question were asked today for the first time. What we’re dealing 
with is an institution that has a lot o f political clout and a lot of momentum. It’s deeply 
ingrained, culturally and politically—not to mention ingrained in the psyche o f the 
American public.”
Marlett is probably right. Ranching is built on one o f the most potent myths in 
the America: the agrarian myth. And so the question o f whether or not grazing should be 
allowed on public lands in the West wasn’t even asked; it simply happened without 
questioning, more than a hundred years ago, as white settlers trickled into and “tamed” 
the country. Every historical book on Steens Mountain that I picked up celebrated the 
culture o f the industrious rancher. Cattle Country o f Pete French, published in 1964, told 
me that “Hamey basin today is cattle country supreme.” Its author, Giles French, 
explained that had it not been for the early ranching settlers, “the West might still be a 
battleground between Indians and whites, with its lands unplowed, its timber decaying,
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its minerals unmined. In the latter part o f this golden age o f the West, the men who won 
respect were those who . . .  developed the ranches to make use o f the most basic resource 
of all: the soil” (French 1964). Despite what now seems like antiquated viewpoints, 
French’s perceptions are only a generation old. And, to some, they still ring true.
Steens Mountain in Oregon's High Desert Country, published in 1967, is 
“dedicated to the pioneer cattlemen and sheepmen who settled this country.” It’s 
primarily a picture book, portraying the landscape o f the Steens as well as the people who 
live there. The photographs are beautiful, though unreal, bathed in those redder than red, 
bluer than blue, and traffic light yellow prints o f the time period. There are essays 
scattered among the photographs, the subjects ranging from “Horseback Geology” to 
“The Marshlands” to “Men on the Mountain” and even “The Worth o f Solitude.” The 
men and their cattle are given equal weight with the plants, birds, animals, streams, and 
gorges o f Steens. The authors and photographer obviously love the pristine, natural 
beauty o f the landscape, but see no conflict between utilizing natural resources and 
respecting the graces o f nature. As man stands alone on a mountaintop, writes E.R. 
Jackman in a Whitmanesque tone within the last chapter o f the book, “he is the center of 
a wheel o f huge diameter. He is the hub o f a vast, visible universe and if he is important 
at all, he is, at the moment, the link between God and all o f these thousands of square 
miles below.” In the first chapter o f the book, the same author stands on a pulpit and 
asserts that “from a practical standpoint about three million more stomachs each year in 
America demand beef. It can be supplied as efficiently from Hamey County as from any 
place in America” (Jackman and ScharfF 1967).
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Within Jackman’s book is a picture of Deadman Gate. Clouds dominate the 
photo, tower above the weathered, gray wood o f the gate, open and leaning off its wire 
hinges. It is connected to an old stone fence, which runs between two rims along the 
west side o f the Blitzen Valley. Sitting on an Appaloosa—one hand resting behind him 
on the saddle’s cantle, elbow bent, and the reining hand resting in front o f him on the 
saddle’s horn—is Fred Witzel. His fecial features are barely visible, shadowed by a 
cowboy hat. A coiled rawhide rope hangs from his saddle. He and horse stand as 
sentinel figures against the open sky. The photo caption states that Witzel runs a “fine 
herd” o f Hereford cattle, and is an “excellent roper and horseman.” It also says that Fred 
Witzel is the son o f John “Ochoco” Witzel, one of the valley pioneers, who was with Pete 
French at Diamond, on June 18,1878, during an Indian attack. Though he was shot 
through the hip, “thirty days later, after the loose pieces o f bone had worked out of his 
leg, John Witzel took off with a band of cattle for Winnemucca, Nevada” (Jackman and 
Scharff 1967).
John Ochoco Witzel’s picture can be found in the book Hamey County Oregon, 
and Its Range Land. He is standing in a group photo, taken in the 1870s, o f early 
pioneers—each o f whom wears a steady, serious look. Witzel is the tallest among them. 
He has blond hair, a straight nose, wire rim glasses, and a clean jaw. His great-grandson, 
also named John Witzel, more than resembles him.
John and Cindy Witzel run a business called Steens Mountain Packers. Not only 
do they guide clients on horse packing and hunting trips, but in the winter, the couple 
leads snowmobile tours, snow shoeing, and cross country skiing opportunities. Their 
base camp is on the mountain, 320 acres above Fish Lake. We sat at their kitchen table
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one night in March 2000, sipped beer, and tried to talk above the strong voice o f their 
loquacious two-year-old son Colton, who competed voraciously to be the center of 
attention.
Witzel’s career began as a cattle rancher, like his father, grandfather, and great­
grandfather. Speaking of the controversial special designation on Steens, Witzel said, “In 
1986, the handwriting was on the wall back then that they were going to do this. And I 
told my dad, I said, ‘I don’t think there there’s a future here. I’m young enough that I can 
change, and I’m going to do something different.’” He quit relying on cattle ranching as 
his sole income, but he couldn’t leave the mountain. “My great-granddad came here in 
the early 1870s. He homesteaded here, and he worked for Pete French off and on. He 
did all kinds o f different things to survive, like we all do. He raised a family here, my 
granddad and his siblings, and my granddad and three o f his siblings homesteaded right 
across the valley. Then the Fish and Wildlife Service decided they wanted this valley for 
the [Malheur National Wildlife] Refuge. What’s happening on Steens right now, to me, 
is an exact repeat of then.”
Like all ranchers, the Witzels have had to make adjustments to their operations 
and lifestyles as a result o f a changing economics, demographics, and values in the West. 
John Witzel’s grandfather had to move the ranch twice, eventually to the Diamond Valley 
on the north end o f Steens. Being a neighbor of the federal government wasn’t always 
easy. But most ranchers at Steens were successful at their business, through the 
ownership of vast tracts o f land. And almost all o f them felt that they had a right to not 
only their own ground but also to a joint stewardship o f the public domain, where their 
predecessors had run cattle before there were any rules to abide by, when the public lands
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were free and unregulated. John “Ochoco” Witzel certainly faced hardship, but not the 
same wall that his great-grandson described to me.
Pete French, for whom “Ochoco” occasionally buckarooed, was one o f the 
most famous cattle barons o f his day. French arrived in the Blitzen Valley in 1872 with 
1,200 cows, twenty saddle horses, and six Mexican vaqueros. He was only twenty-three 
and saw the oasis o f grass and dependable water flowing from Steens as just the right 
ingredients for a cattle operation. French had ridden for two months, a journey which 
began in northern California and took him past the Warner Valley, south o f Hart 
Mountain, Beatty’s Butte, and finally to Roaring Springs in the Catlow Valley. There a 
discouraged prospector sold French his “P” brand and cattle, and with them came his 
range: land that stretched up over the Catlow Rim to the Donner und Blitzen River and 
across that to the top of the mountain. With the backing of Dr. John Glenn, a famous 
California wheat grower, French began buying land at once, moving steadily up the 
Blitzen Valley towards Malheur Lake. He built one of the largest single cattle ranches in 
the United States in less than twenty-eight years: the firm, French-Glenn, owned over 
150,000 acres o f land (Brimlow 1951).
French was able to make his start with that failed prospector’s cattle and range 
under the then existing rules o f possession: first come, first served. “Usage,” writes Giles 
French, “rather than outright ownership of the land itself, determined the right to control” 
(French 1964). The right to control, initiated during settlement, would continue well past 
that era and become even more important in the next century o f grazing policy. But it 
was bom into western ranching with cattlemen such as French, when the land was free 
and there for the taking. French, a few other large landowners, and dozens o f small
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landowners took up much of the natural meadowland, aspen glens, and creeks by 1878 (a 
fact that would prove problematic when the question o f special designation o f Steens 
became an issue in the 1990s).
Throughout the West at French’s time, land was acquired by the manipulation o f 
the General Homestead Act o f 1862, which allowed a maximum o f only 160 acres—not 
nearly enough for a cattle operation in the arid West. Additional parcels were acquired 
from other homesteaders or relatives or “dummies,” paid off homesteaders. And though 
the deeded land was important as the location of the base ranch, the acres were small in 
comparison with the total amount o f public land—free and unregulated—controlled by 
the rancher under an established “home rule” code. In Crossing the Next Meridian, 
Charles Wilkinson explains that “range rights,” were “recognized as a matter o f custom 
for all land actually grazed within the drainage in which the base ranch was located; it 
was not uncommon for range rights to apply to thirty or forty square miles” (Wilkinson 
1992).
Wilkinson goes on to describe how a typical ranch of the time operated, a 
description that adequately fits the settlement pattern o f the Steens country. Base ranches 
were located on rich bottomlands, alongside creeks and rivers. The surrounding land was 
federal domain public land, “and in the spring, summer, and fall, ranchers would turn 
loose their stock to graze on tens o f thousands o f acres of higher land above the base 
ranches”—as they still do today (Wilkinson 1992). In this way, a very small number of 
ranchers, like Pete French, were able to control entire watersheds—even though perhaps 
not all o f the land belonged to them.
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At Steens Mountain, other stockmen from California began crowding in by 1870. 
Early settlers took up the swampland and most o f the land that could be irrigated, but left 
thousands o f acres o f land owned by the federal government open to homestead entry. 
The Enlarged Homestead Act o f 1909—which differed from the 1862 act by allowing 
settlers 320 acres—brought out dryland farmers to the mountain, who still, more often 
than not, failed and sold their land to the already established ranchers who held water 
rights. Most o f the ranches on Steens today were built by adding one homestead after 
another, piece by piece (Brimlow 1951).
Before the land exchanges that came with the 2000 legislation on Steens, the 
BLM reported that on the north portion o f the mountain, 31 percent or 111,100 acres 
were privately held. On the southern end, 58,600 acres or 48 percent o f the mountain 
was private. On the central part, 15 percent or 48,200 acres, and on the southeast portion, 
14,900 acres or 13 percent of the mountain was private ground. These 232,700 acres, 
comprising 25 percent o f the mountain, were split among 239 landowners. And twenty- 
three permittees controlled 68,675 AUMS on public land (BLM 1999). Steens Mountain, 
writes Giles French, “was never a country for the small landowner; it takes a lot o f it for 
financial security” (French 1964).
That amount o f private land, consolidated throughout the generations o f ranchers 
and, eventually, corporations, proved to be one o f the locals’ best cards at the negotiation 
table. Though Secretary Babbitt promised that it wouldn’t affect his threat o f use o f the 
Antiquities Act, the ranchers used it as leverage against national monument designation 
with their own threats o f fencing it off or developing it should Clinton use his 
administrative authority.
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The ranchers’ high country land, those fragile, pristine meadows and alpine 
gorges, was an important bargaining point for another reason. The environmentalists 
wanted the land under public ownership—wanted cows off o f it—and were able to 
negotiate for it by offering the ranchers economic adjustments and often seven times as 
much public land in the desert below. The land trades were one o f the keystones o f the 
bill that finally passed Congress. And they wouldn’t have happened, at least not in the 
same way, with monument designation.
But it wasn’t just land that established ranchers as the other major player at 
Steens; they held a key political card as well. By settling an “unsettled” country and 
grazing unregulated land over a hundred years ago, their predecessors established what 
they saw as a right to control. And the industry as a whole would attempt to hold onto 
that right, most often successfully, throughout changes in grazing policy over the course 
o f the next century. Pete French, at age forty-eight, was shot and killed on a sagebrush 
flat by an angry and struggling settler, who was resentful o f the land baron—but not 
before he established an empire.
Yet, in the end, even French’s empire broke apart. Some years after his death, 
part o f his ranch was sold to another livestock company. In 1935, the federal government 
bought 65,000 acres o f it to add to the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (Brimlow 
1951). Would French roll over in his grave if he knew that the marshland he reclaimed 
for his cattle was restored for migratory birds? Today, the Blitzen Valley is dominated 
by the refuge— not one man’s ranch—and this change parallels not only the recent 
transformation on Steens but also the transformation of the rangeland at large. Bit by bit,
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the ranchers’ hegemony over the public lands has eroded. But it has not disappeared.
The fact that ranchers were able to get as much as they did out o f the Steens agreement 
proves that they their grip, though perhaps not as tight, is still firm.
Though ranchers never received rights to the range by law, they were left, as 
Wilkinson puts it, with an unwritten privilege: their own code “built on manipulation of 
the land disposal laws, physical possession o f the federal range, intimidation, illegal 
fencing, and customary recognition of range rights among themselves” (Wilkinson 1992). 
That privilege was not to last uncontested. Attempts at displacing the ranchers’ code 
began with the Taylor Grazing Act, which ended the era o f homesteading and brought, as 
the following decades would eventually prove, the defacto, unofficial end o f land 
disposal. The act also initiated the era o f regulation through grazing fees. Opponents of 
the ranchers’ rule pointed to the overgrazing that had occurred since the late 1800s. The 
land was beat to hell, and the droughts o f the Dust Bowl and the poverty brought by the 
Great Depression didn’t help matters. But those seeking to implement new polices found 
out that an unwritten code was often harder to break than one set in stone by law.
The Taylor Grazing Act became law on June 28, 1934. The act authorized the 
secretary o f the interior to establish grazing districts and develop any regulations to 
administer these districts, including charging fees for use o f the land, granting leases for 
up to ten years, pursuing range improvement projects, and establishing cooperative 
agreements with landowners. However, the secretary was also expected to cooperate 
with “local associations o f stockmen” in the administrative districts, a feature 
Representative Taylor, the bill’s sponsor, called “democracy on the range” (Klyza 1996). 
National and local advisory boards, made up mostly o f ranchers, heavily influenced the
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act. One scholar asserts that these boards determined the allocation o f permits, 
supervised the expenditure o f range improvement funds, were influential in the selection 
o f staff, and were the “real decision makers” in setting grazing fees. Though these boards 
were supposed to be advisory, in reality they established and enacted the rules (Foss 
1960). The grazing boards were quid pro quo, designed to appease the furious cowboy, 
who was accustomed to a free range and who would put up with only so much regulation.
And he would only put up with regulation that was short-lived. Importantly, the 
act also included the phrase, “pending final disposal,” to pacify westerners who felt the 
rangeland should be transferred to private ownership, or at the very lest, the states. Until 
the passage of the Federal Land Policy Management Act in 1976, ranchers would hold 
onto this technicality. Many believed that the disposal o f the public lands was imminent. 
And even though they didn’t own the land, even though it remained public, ranchers 
acted like the range was still theirs. They continued to control it, and the Grazing Service 
(established by the Taylor Grazing Act as the first “regulatory” range agency) and later 
the BLM (created from the consolidation o f the Grazing Service and the General Land 
Office in 1946) had no choice but to let them. They both suffered under the image o f an 
agency that ultimately possessed a short life.
Grazing fees on rangeland were set at low levels (at the enactment o f the Taylor 
Grazing Act, Forest Service fees were three times as high) and would continue to stay 
low despite numerous efforts to raise them. Permits almost always went to existing stock 
interests. The Grazing Service was constantly understaffed, underfunded, and at the 
whim o f congressmen who controlled its budget. Wilkinson explains that “the new 
agency could do little more than rubber stamp decisions made by the advisory boards
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dominated by ranchers, the very group the Taylor Grazing Act supposedly had been 
enacted to regulate” (Wilkinson 1992). Nonetheless, the stage had been set with the 
Taylor Grazing Act. The disposal of western land had ended, in practice. Regulation had 
begun. Ranchers’ attempts at reclaiming the range, such as the Sagebrush Rebellion and 
the county supremacy movements o f the eighties, would remain only that—attempts.
The Taylor Grazing Act represented the first, major incursion in the ranchers’ 
hegemony on the range. And the attackers came away with some success. Next the 
battle moved to the setting o f AUM fees (animal unit per month or the amount of forage 
needed for one cow and a calf or five sheep for one month). Since the inception o f the 
act, fees remained at a low $.05 per cow or horse per month and $.01 per sheep or goat. 
While the Great Depression and former use o f the free range may have made these levels 
seem acceptable, it wasn’t until 1947 that fees rose to $.08—and not without a fight from 
livestock groups, senators, and western congressmen. This scenario, the struggle to raise 
fees on BLM lands to fair market value, was to be repeated again and again: the fee 
painfully inched up by pennies over the decades and sometimes even dropped. 
Historically, AUMs have been kept far below fair market value as well as below the fees 
charged on private and state lands (Klyza 1996). The ranchers and their western 
congressmen didn’t own the land, but they managed to control it.
Even today, critics charge that the federal grazing program is heavily subsidized. 
And environmental groups—such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Oregon 
Natural Desert Association, and Oregon Natural Resources Council—have made their 
voices heard over the low fees, which they feel subsidize commodity-interest on public 
lands as well as encourage overgrazing, which in turn reduces fish habitat and forage
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available for wildlife. In 1985, Office o f Management and Budget studies concluded that 
grazing revenues only covered approximately 35 percent of spending on such programs; 
by not charging fair market value, the government may have lost $500 million over the 
last ten years place (Klyza 1996). But twenty-eight senators and forty representatives 
urged President Reagan to extend the current fee program for ten years—he did so 
indefinitely.
Yet the situation is not so simple that individual ranchers can be singled out as 
avaricious cowboys, seeking undue profit on the range. The grazing system, fair or 
unfair, puts ranchers in a position where the low-fee grazing permits have become a sort 
of property right. Whenever a ranch is bought or sold, the federal grazing permits are an 
integral part of the deal, since BLM leases are often carried with the base ranch. Thus, 
private lands are worth more money when associated grazing privileges are associated 
with them. The value o f these grazing leases has become capitalized and amortized into 
the value o f the private land, and ranchers pay for the leases up-front whenever they buy 
or re-finance a ranch (Klyza 1996). Klyza points out that, because o f this, you can’t quite 
call the low AUMs subsidies, since they affect the value o f a rancher’s deeded land. To 
further complicate matters, the permits have been used as security for bank loans and 
included in the appraised value of the lands. Wilkinson writes that “politically, a 
proposal to reduce AUMs or to increase grazing fees have translated into lobbying by the 
banking industry as well as the ranching industry” (Wilkinson 1992).
Here the issue of control and ownership arise once more. If you possess a grazing 
lease that is attached to a ranch, which increases the ranch’s worth when it’s bought or 
sold, who really controls that lease land—even if it is federally owned? This issue would
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be played out during the Steens negotiations when ranchers received five to seven times 
as much land in the low country, plus millions o f dollars in economic adjustments, in 
exchange for their private land with its associated public land grazing privileges in the 
Steens high country.
Ranchers most often won the battle over fees, but environmentalists made some 
gains with the enactment of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 
1976. The passage o f FLMPA represented a significant challenge to the grazing industry. 
After the Taylor Grazing Act, it was the second great gauge in the ranchers’ hegemony 
and had twice the impact. For the first time since its birth in 1946, the BLM’s mission 
was articulated through congressional mandate. The act replaced over 3,500 public land 
laws relating to the BLM with a single organic act (Dana and Fairfax 1980). The BLM 
would now be a professional land-planning agency—not an agency temporarily holding 
title to the federal rangeland and, in the meantime, virtually giving away its economic and 
ecological value to industry.
Importantly, FLPMA declared that the public lands the BLM managed should 
remain public—officially ending what had ended in practice with the Taylor Grazing Act. 
That phrase, “pending final disposal,” was itself disposed of, and with it ranchers’ hopes 
o f ever returning to their complete rule o f the range. They had believed and acted as if it 
belonged to them in the four decades since the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act, but 
FLMPA shattered that belief in future ownership and, for the first time, began to impinge 
on their control. The range was now acknowledged as important to wildlife as well as 
cattle and sheep, and the public lands were declared subject to multiple-use management.
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Still, FLPMA did not escape the rancher’s home rule. Grazing interests received 
strong representation as the act evolved in the House Public Lands Subcommittee— 
which was dominated by westerners and thus became more pro-industry and less 
environmental than some members o f Congress would have favored. But without certain 
compromises, there would have be no organic bill at all (Klyza 1996). These included a 
lack o f resolution on the grazing fee controversy; ten-year permits for grazing (the 
current permittee had the first priority for lease renewal—virtually guaranteeing a rancher 
the use o f public lands as long as they are slated for "grazing); and reasonable 
compensation for private improvements on public lands if a permit is cancelled (which 
portrays the extent to which the permits have become like property rights). Additionally, 
grazing advisory boards, which were eliminated in the early 1970s and replaced by 
multiple use advisory boards, were brought back to life. As before, members were to be 
elected from permittees in each area.
Despite the additional regulation that FLPMA brought, ranchers shoved their 
heels in their stirrups and sat deep in the saddle. They weren’t about to give up. Klyza 
simplifies the complexity o f decades o f wrangling, economics, and politics by 
summarizing a century of grazing policy as a “captured policy program.” Since the 
beginning, grazing was instituted with an “extralegal property-rights system, low fees, 
and home rule on the range” (Klyza 1996). Ranchers, as an interest group on the federal 
rangeland, gained control before the rules were set and managed to hold onto that control 
fiercely. After the rules were established, they developed a powerful legislative capacity 
through influence over the state legislatures and the ability to ward off federal control. 
Though there are fewer than 30,000 ranchers holding grazing permits for BLM lands,
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these ranchers have a disproportionate amount o f power nationally; they hold key 
political positions in thinly populated western states.
This is what brought the ranchers, as an interest group, to the negotiation table at 
Steens: a strong political history, at least four generations o f culture and economy on the 
mountain, and the virtual control o f the public rangeland. Though there are only about 
thirty-five o f them, they are an institutional presence in Harney County, on Steens. But 
the Steens agreement—preceded by the effects o f the Taylor Grazing Act, FLPMA, and a 
successful environmental coalition built on science, politics, and changing economics and 
demographics—would signal a major change.
Republican Congressman Greg Walden represents Oregon’s 2nd District, which 
encompasses almost all o f the land east o f the Cascades as well as part o f southern 
Oregon. His district comprises over two-thirds o f the state—twenty counties or 70,000 
square miles. Walden was a major opponent o f monument designation at Steens. His 
office wrote the original bill for the legislation. Though Representative Walden 
represents a minority of the people in the state o f Oregon, I was told—more than once—  
by both environmentalists and BLM staff, that only he could have sponsored and passed 
this bill. Andy Kerr, a self-proclaimed “political hack,” offered this insight:
“Greg Walden is very proud of the fact that he got the first cow-free wilderness in 
Harney County. And there’s something to be said for that. There’s an old Vulcan phrase 
that Spock uses in one o f the Star Trek movies. My metaphor for it is only Nixon could 
go to China. Which is true. Only the greatest anticommunist could open up the door to 
communist China. Prior to this, you never saw any Green Republican or Democrat in the
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United States Congress pushing cow-free wilderness. But it was Walden and [Oregon 
Republican Senator Gordon] Smith that put it on the table. Such a deal.”
Such is the power of a western congressman in the grazing arena.
In a speech on the House Floor on October 4,2000, the day the legislation passed, 
Walden waxed poetic about the people o f Harney County and drew upon the virtues o f 
ranching culture, part of an institution that is deeply ingrained in the psyche of the 
American public—deeply ingrained because it draws upon the powerful agrarian myth. 
Ranching has survived as much upon this myth as it has on its political and physical grip 
o f the range. It is the myth o f the industrious, brave, and lone cowboy settling a wild 
land and taming it. It upholds the sacred American tenets o f freedom, individualism, and 
opportunity. It is the myth that Giles French and E.R, Jackman dwelt upon so adoringly, 
and it is so strong that, even today, a politician can shamelessly romanticize it. “These 
are people whose ancestors were encouraged by the federal government to take the risk of 
expanding our Nation’s frontier, to risk life and property to settle the Wild West.”
Walden proclaimed to Congress. ‘They were homesteaders of the 1800s, people o f 
undaunted courage who followed the trail to the West blazed by Lewis and Clark some 
two-hundred years ago.”
And later in the speech: ‘These are people whose closest neighbor is often miles 
and miles away. They are self-reliant people with soft hearts but rugged spirits.”
Finally: Tt is a place where written contracts are not broken because usually 
written contracts are not needed, a man’s word is all it takes, a handshake will do. They 
do not get much from the government other than a tax bill, and they sure do not ask for a 
lot in return” (Walden 2000).
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Walden could have been sentimentalizing any ranchers in the West, at any time in 
the past hundred years. And though their numbers are small, these communities, these 
“rugged spirits,” through their representatives in the House and Senate, have dominated 
the management and policy of public rangeland in the West. Over and over again, 
western congressmen slashed budgets and stalled or killed bills over grazing acts or 
attempts to raise the grazing fee on public lands. Home rule on the range has held its 
grip.
It is certain that E.R. Jackman believed in the agrarian myth, and maybe he’d 
disagree with Bill Marlett’s assertion that ranchers aren’t environmentalists or be 
surprised at Andy Kerr’s ‘Visceral antipathy to livestock.” Three million more stomachs 
each year may require American beef, as Jackman believes, but, as Charles Wilkinson 
points out, the federal lands contribute only 2 percent to our national livestock 
production, while western private land contributes 17 percent. Private lands in the East 
make up the rest, accounting for 81 percent (Wilkinson 1992). But it must be 
remembered that the myth o f the cowboy translates into political reality. Despite these 
small numbers, more acres o f the eleven western states are dedicated to cattle ranching 
than anything else: 258 million acres of public rangeland. And the number of AUMS on 
BLM land is steady at 13.5 million, not much below the number o f grazing permits set 
two years after the Taylor Grazing Act was passed.
But times are changing. In May, 2000, the Supreme Court unanimously made a 
ruling that upholds regulatory changes adopted by the Department of Interior in 1995: the 
elimination of the preference that grazing permit holders had when their permits were up 
for renewal; the allowance o f non-ranchers to hold grazing permits; and the right o f the
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government to hold title to any range improvements, such as fences or water systems, 
even if they were built by ranchers (Gregory 2000).
Times are changing. After four generations o f family ranching, John Witzel no 
longer ranches. Environmentalists hold up the legislated cattle-free wilderness at Steens 
as proof o f a new era. And it is. The crack in ranchers’ home rule on the range was first 
opened by the Taylor Grazing Act and FLPMA, and then widened by changing 
economics, demographics, and values. The Steens agreement represents another fracture, 
grown from the first, which may have broken that hegemony entirely. Andy Kerr opined 
that the ranchers were willing to accept the cattle-free provision, as well as negotiate land 
trades, because they have “much political, social, and economic incentive to move their 
operations off o f the high Steens. Increasing conflicts with other users, legal 
requirements under the Endangered Species Act, and other considerations are ‘forcing’ 
them out.”
“I guess there’s no doubt about it that environmental laws aire making ranching 
more complicated, more time consuming, and to a certain extent, more expensive than 
historically it was. It’s difficult, but by no means impossible,” said Stacy Davies when I 
mentioned Kerr’s comment. ‘I ’m sure they’d like to think that they’ve put us in a vice 
and have got a big squeeze on us,” he continued, “but I think it can go two ways. When 
we start having successes and documenting our successes, it makes them nervous too.”
Those successes might have translated into part o f the ranchers’ defense against a 
monument designation. Stacey Davies, though admitting to land abuse by Roaring 
Springs' previous owners, argues that the ranch currently practices some o f the best land 
management strategies and grazing regimes— it has been adjusting with the changing
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times. Though Bill Marlett states he’s never heard o f a progressive rancher, Davies 
asserts even the Secretary of the Interior recognized Roaring Springs’ conservation 
efforts. “Stacey,” Davies claimed Babbitt said, “you must either be a really nice guy or 
. you must be doing a good job. The United States Fish and Wildlife won’t get off my 
back for fear I’m going to disturb your conservation agreement.”
Perhaps he thought they’d fail. Perhaps he knew, or at least hoped, they’d 
succeed. But Babbitt stood back and gave ranchers, environmentalists, the governor, and 
the Oregon delegation an opportunity to try and cooperate. The time was right for 
change.
31
IV 
Cascade Divide: 
The Rise of Desert Conservation
The most pervasive and insidious threat to the Oregon Desert is domestic livestock 
grazing. Livestock have done more damage to the Earth than the chainsaw. . .
They are an abomination. —Andy Kerr, Oregon Desert Guide
Diverse regions are often simply defined by where the population resides. This 
holds true for Oregon, where the metropolitan areas o f Portland, Salem, and Eugene dot 
the Willamette River Valley and Interstate 5. Most Oregonians squeeze themselves into 
this lush farming belt between the Cascade Mountains and the Coast Range. Here, 
residents have never had to go without the color green. They are accustomed to big trees 
and bigger volcanoes. They are accustomed to having their way. Because of them, 
Oregon has gained the reputation as one of the most libera! places in the West. For when 
it comes to politics, western Oregon urbanites almost always steer the ship for the entire 
state—imposing their values on the “empty” two-thirds, east of the Cascades. Yet though 
the people living on the edge o f temperate rainforests and the Pacific Ocean are known to 
define what Oregon is all about, look at any map and you’ll see that what dominates 
Oregon geographically is desert.
Portland is a microcosm of the Cascade geographic divide o f Oregon itself. The 
metro looks seaward and abroad. Its sidewalks are slick with water and covered in moss; 
skyscrapers, banks, museums, and universities attest to its financial and cultural wealth. 
The city sits at the crossroads o f the Willamette, the river o f western Oregon, and the 
Columbia, the river o f the Pacific Northwest. Portland is home to national environmental 
groups and a liberal, voting population within an hour’s drive o f the capital—people with 
the means to influence the fate o f Steens Mountain. David Blackstun, BLM Bums
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District Supervisory Natural Resource Specialist and Assistant Field Manager, 
commented, “There’s a social evolution as we become more affluent. People have the 
ability from Portland and Eugene to talk about environmentalism and not have any threat 
to their well being, their economic livelihood. They like coming out here and walking in 
the gorges and not seeing cows or cow pies.”
The Cascade divide is also representative o f the quintessential urban/rural 
divide—a divide that defines not only Oregon but also the West at large. And it affects 
the way we view our public lands. When I talked to Bill Marlett, executive director o f 
ONDA, in Bend, a small city in Central Oregon that is rapidly becoming a recreation- 
tourist mecca, he spoke of the issue in a quiet, blunt way. “The fact is, 99% of the 
population in the West is urban,” he said, estimating to make a point. “And the cold, 
hard reality is that the public lands are going to become the playground o f people living 
in the West and the United States in general. That trend is becoming very clear.”
Even though Steens Mountain exists in one o f the most rural, remote parts of the 
state, it is not exempt from urban recreational needs or environmental values. It is not 
exempt from the changing economics and demographics of the West. While Secretary 
Babbitt worked diligently to develop an environmental legacy for both himself and 
President Clinton, Oregon’s Governor John Kitzhaber began to consider his own legacy 
and the jewels that existed within his state— ecologically sensitive places and areas where 
people, especially urban people, might find solitude. According to Kevin Smith, Director 
of Governor Kitzhaber’s Resource Office in Washington D.C., Steens was very high, if 
not his number one priority. The governor’s office, along with other Oregon Democratic 
senators and representatives, quickly joined the negotiations—playing a part in every step
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o f the legislative process. Peter Green, the governor’s forestry advisor, explained that, 
“there was this logic train that the governor bought into. The first was that this was a 
national, statewide interest. To go there you say, look, this isn’t just for Harney County 
to decide.”
And so Harney Countians bargained for Steens Mountain, little known by most of 
the country and even some Oregonians. Despite their sentiment that locals knew the 
mountain best, power from the distant urban East and a closer urban West would help 
determine the mountain’s fate.
The Steens Mountain area is a place o f exceptional ecological diversity, a “sky 
island” that supports plants and animals otherwise found in widely separated areas, either 
farther north or on other mountains. Several plant species, including the Steens Mountain 
paintbrush and Steens Mountain thistle, grow here and nowhere else. Biologists have 
described five different vegetation zones from the Alvord Basin to the tundra zone at the 
mountain’s highest elevations (Brown 2000). Steens is home to rare and endangered 
flora, the endemic Catlow Valley redband trout and Borax Lake chub, bighorn sheep, 
wild horse herds o f Spanish descent, sage grouse, raptors, 18,000 head o f cattle, and 
thirty-five ranchers.
Though much o f the mountain is in the public domain, around twenty-five percent 
of it is privately owned—about 232,000 acres (before the legislated land trades) (BLM 
1999). Despite or because of the fact that such large tracts of private land existed, a 
coalition o f environmental groups has continuously pushed for stricter protection o f
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Steens. Over the past ten years there were multiple initiatives to provide a special 
designation for the mountain.
‘There’s been proposals to make Steens a national park, there’s been proposals 
for a national monument, there’s been proposals for a national conservation area, and 
Congressman [Bob] Smith, a former congressman here, actually submitted a bill in the 
early nineties that went forward but didn’t really get anywhere,” explained David 
Blackstun. Smith’s bill, according to Blackstun, didn’t have as much collaborative work 
in the community as the 2000 bill that finally passed. Predictably, environmentalists 
were not happy with it. It’s safe to say that Smith’s national conservation area proposal 
was a conservative reaction to environmentalists’ eye on the mountain. The vast high 
desert is primarily made up o f “unprotected” BLM land, except for Wilderness Study 
Areas. This fact was not lost on the state’s growing and powerful environmental 
community, who envisioned Steens Mountain as part o f a larger Southeast Oregon and 
upper Great Basin protection proposal. Their plans included several million acres o f 
designated wilderness with Steens Mountain as the crown jewel.
“I guess one thing that has amazed me, that I’ve learned more out o f this than 
anything, is how the environmental community has gained power,” said Stacy Davies 
when I talked to him in October, 2000. I had finished asking questions about the 
particulars of the bill and the process of negotiation, and we were nearing the end o f our 
conversation—one that had been interrupted by phone calls from the Oregonian, the 
Bend Bulletin, and TV camera crews. The bill had just passed the House that morning, 
and Davies’ “sound bites” were in high demand. “What gave a guy like—and I’m not 
picking on him—Bill Marlett, what gave him the right to even be involved in this
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process? How did he gain any reason to be involved in this process? What empowered 
him?” Davies suddenly asked me. I commented that national environmental laws had 
something to do with it, but it wasn’t exactly the answer he was looking for. “Yeah, but 
him as an individual—when they looked at the players at the table . . .  Answer me, I 
guess I’m going to ask you the question. What gave him the right to be at the table?’
Maps o f Steens, Roaring Springs’ property lines, and numerous GIS copies, 
which had continuously evolved and changed with the legislation, lay scattered thick 
across the table. I looked out the window of the ranch office. Cattle spaced themselves 
evenly across the Catlow Valley, which looked remarkably lush for the time o f year. At 
the valley’s southwestern edge, clouds mixed with Hart Mountain, a 9,000-foot volcanic 
fault block that rises 4,000 feet above the Warner Valley and its wetlands. From where I 
sat, it looked as if the bowls, canyons, and blue ridges o f the mountain could be the 
underside o f heavy clouds or the clouds could be the mountain itself.
The Hart Mountain National Antelope Refuge, encompassing 240,000 acres or 
375 square miles, was established in 1936 to preserve, manage, and study pronghorn 
antelope and other wildlife. But like Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, livestock 
grazing continued there—until 1991. A severe drought prompted the removal o f cattle in 
order to allow the vegetation to recover. It also prompted a coalition o f conservation 
groups, including The Wilderness Society, the Audubon Society o f Portland, Oregon 
Wildlife Federation, and Bill Marlett’s Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA) to 
file a lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. The groups charged that the 
federal agency’s management o f the refuge favored livestock and was not consistent with 
the purposes for which the refuge was created. The lawsuit brought a settlement that
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created a new fifteen-year management plan for the refuge, which was implemented in 
1994. Livestock were removed, grazing permits retired, and the unhappy ranchers simply 
had to adjust. At the time, Marlett called the result “one o f the largest cow-free areas of 
public land in the Great Basin” (Grossman 2000).
I told Davies that I guessed Bill Marlett’s power stemmed form ONDA’s ' 
involvement with Oregon desert issues and participation in lawsuits for the past twenty 
years. I also supposed that his power came from the movement in general and its attempt 
to enforce environmental laws through litigation.
“And you’re right,” Davies said. “I guess the thing I learned out o f this was that 
his predecessors got the laws on the books. And the question I keep asking myself is how 
do you do that?’ He paused. “Essentially he took up a cause that he’s impassioned with, 
and then he infiltrated the press. The way you do that is through lawsuits and just 
pounding, pounding, pounding—being relentless with your message.”
The Oregon desert conservation message is personified by Alice Elshoff, who 
likes to say that she was bom in 1934, the year the Taylor Grazing Act was passed, and 
hopes to see grazing discontinued on public lands within her lifetime. We had talked in 
her living room the evening before Stacy Davies and I met. The outcome o f the bill was 
unknown at that point. She hoped for its passage—it contained more than 
conservationists ever could have received with a national monument designation.
On the wall behind her hung a picture of a sandhill crane feeding in a marshy 
pool. Throughout her house were photographs o f birds, many taken at Malheur, in which 
the creatures appear almost luminary. Alice Elshoff and her husband Cal first starting
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coming to the refuge during the fifties and remember when the road was paved no more 
than ten miles out of Bums. I asked her how she became involved in the Steens issue and 
environmentalism. "I actually started ONDA,” she laughed. Elshoff and another 
conservationist became politically active in 1976, when Congress mandated the BLM to 
inventory potential wilderness areas (all roadless areas o f 5,000 acres or more and all 
roadless islands with wilderness characteristics) by 1991 under the Federal Land Policy 
Management Act (FLPMA). Since the 1964 Wilderness Act did not require any review 
o f roadless areas managed by the BLM, this was an important step for the preservation o f 
BLM land.
A problematic aspect o f FLPMA was the classification o f BLM potential 
wilderness areas. The agency was directed to protect the wilderness qualities o f all 
identified areas with wilderness characteristics during the study period, while 
simultaneously allowing existing uses—including mining and grazing activities—to 
continue. As the desert conservation community grew, this would eventually lead to 
lawsuits against the agency, as it did on Steens. A typical scenario might include a 
rancher, who constructs a fence to protect a stream or riparian area in a Wilderness Study 
Area (WSA)—attempting to obey the law and protect wilderness qualities—and an 
environmental group, which subsequently sues, because by building a fence that rancher 
has violated the act by impairing its potential to become designated wilderness. It makes 
grazing in that WSA and simultaneously protecting its wilderness qualities almost 
impossible. Andy Kerr describes the situation this way:
“The way the BLM has interpreted its mandate under section 603 o f FLPMA is 
that it has to manage these areas so as to not impair their suitability for wilderness.
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There’s a fair argument to be made that it’s actually more difficult for ranchers to operate 
their grazing operation in WSAs than in wilderness, because historically livestock has 
been grandfathered into wilderness. The downside is we want a lot more wilderness than 
WSAs, but the WSAs have a bigger interim o f protection.”
While WSAs have competing directives—the allowance o f existing uses and the 
protection of wilderness qualities—designated wilderness areas virtually protect the 
continuance o f livestock grazing, if that right has been grandfathered in. But most 
ranchers hate wilderness designation as much as environmentalists love it—and for the 
same reasons: not only for the additional protection and restrictions it brings, but also for 
what it means. Wilderness is commonly acknowledged as the highest form o f protection, 
a place where “man” is a visitor only.
Elshoff related how her grassroots group was involved in that early classification 
process o f WSAs. She said that the BLM came up with its initial inventory in eastern 
Oregon, which was about six million acres, and then began running the numbers through 
filters, dropping areas that wouldn’t be studied. The agency’s cuts brought the acreage 
that was to be designated as Wilderness Study Areas down to about 2.5 million. Elshoff 
couldn’t believe it. “A bunch o f us who liked the desert began to think, ‘Whoa, look at 
the places they’ve dropped. This is shocking, a lot o f those are wonderful places,”’ she 
said. In the early eighties, they put together a group o f volunteers, which would 
eventually become ONDA, and began sending people out into the desert to do their own 
inventory, which would eventually be called the Sage Proposal.
ONDA monitored the inventory process and testified in Washington D.C. over 
lands they felt shouldn’t be dropped from WSA status; the group’s work resulted in an
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expansion of acreage declared WSA. By 1989, ONDA incorporated and received its 
non-profit status. By the time the BLM inventory was finalized, the group was well 
established and so began tackling other desert issues, especially grazing. Members never 
lost sight of the Sage Proposal, which in 1992 grew into a more detailed and vast 
vision—one which not only protected land but also established grazing as enemy number 
one in the desert. It became known as the Oregon High Desert Protection Act (OHDPA). 
“We were stumping for that for a long, long time,” said Elshoff.
“The myth o f the cowboy is as strong as ever,” Bill Marlett told John Sterling, 
writing for Earth Island Journal, in 1993. “But cowboys are not environmentalists” 
(Sterling 1993). And so a coalition o f environmental groups unveiled the Oregon High 
Desert Protection Act, which seeks to prohibit grazing on almost six million acres of 
public land in eastern Oregon. Steens Mountain was the centerpiece o f the proposal, a 
500,000-acre national park surrounded by a 523,000-acre national preserve. OHDPA is a 
conservationist’s utopian box, filled with forty-seven wilderness areas, three national 
monuments, the expansion and creation o f wildlife refuges, and fifty-four wild and scenic 
rivers.
But perhaps the most controversial issue is the phase-out o f livestock grazing in 
ten years: a mandatory buy-out o f grazing permits in all special designations, including 
wilderness areas. Grazing has been grandfathered into wilderness designations since 
1922, when Aldo Leopold wrote his management proposal to establish the nation’s first 
formally protected wilderness area in New Mexico’s Gila National Forest. The 
Wilderness Act o f 1964 also allows for grazing to continue in areas where it historically 
has been allowed. Andy Kerr and Mark Salvo write that “every relevant wilderness bill
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enacted by Congress has included language to provide for livestock grazing” (Kerr and 
Salvo 2000).
OHDPA’s call to phase out grazing was and is a fairly radical idea, one that 
ranchers and even other conservationists oppose. “We came to a kind o f a split,” 
explained Elshoff, “which always seems to happen, unfortunately. The Sierra Club went 
off on its own because the leaders weren’t happy with our trying to get grazing out of 
wilderness—actually redoing the wilderness law. When it was written in 1964, grazing 
was not the big issue, and the grazers were cleverer than we were and were able to get 
language in there that grandfathered it in. We thought it was time to revisit that.”
The alternative proposal, supported primarily by the Sierra Club, is called the 
Oregon Desert Conservation Act (ODCA). It differs little from OHDPA, other than on 
the grazing issue. ODCA proposes a mandatory buyout for all non-wilderness special 
designations (such as national monuments, wildlife refuges, and national conservation 
areas) and requires only voluntary buy-out o f grazing permits in wilderness areas and 
non-designated BLM lands in eastern Oregon. In an analysis o f the differences between 
ODCA and OHDPA, Bill Marlett writes that though some see cattle-free wilderness as a 
political impossibility, “it is critical that we begin our struggle for wilderness protection 
by asking for what we want, rather than for what some believe is politically feasible” 
(Marlett 1999a).
And though both ODCA and OHDPA still have a bleak political future, cattle-free 
wilderness was achieved with the passage o f the 2000 Steens Cooperation Management 
and Protection Act. That achievement, says Andy Kerr, happened because the Oregon 
conservation community in the arid West is much more exercised about livestock grazing
41
than other communities. “The significance o f this Steens legislation is that it’s the first 
legislated livestock-free wilderness. And that’s because we made an issue of it,” he 
opined.
“Why compromise at the beginning?” Alice Elshoff asked with a smile. “There’s 
always compromising in the end. Why not start out asking for what you really want?”
The phone hadn’t rung in quite awhile at Roaring Springs Ranch. Stacy Davies 
and I continued to ponder the rise o f desert conservation, which was quickly changing the 
historically powerful face o f ranching in the West. “Farmers and ranchers are the 
greatest whiners on earth sometimes. But yet, just try to get these ranchers in this 
community to pay their dues through the Harney County Cattleman’s Association. And 
they want to stay home and farm. So do I,” he said. “But the reality is, if  people want to 
make a difference in the United States they still can. We may not agree with their cause, 
but the bottom line is, if they want to make a difference they can.” He added, “And 
whining doesn’t do you any good.”
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V
A Legacy of Conquest?
This time he [Babbitt] comes west bearing a big stick and a small carrot.
--Ed Marston, High Country News, April 2000
On a clear, bright day in March o f2000, Mike Golden sat across from me in Mrs. 
Beasley’s cafe in Redmond, Oregon—a town that lies just north of Bend on Highway 97, 
under a western skyline o f Oregon volcanoes. Golden, a retired fisheries biologist and 
chair of the Southeast Oregon Resource Advisory Council, had suggested that we meet in 
this greasy spoon, steak-and-eggs, family restaurant where easy-listening hits o f the 
sixties and seventies are piped softly through the speakers and flapjacks span the 
diameter o f a plate. Uniformed waitresses in pantyhose and tennis shoes made sure our 
coffee cups were eternally filled. “If you don’t mind, I’d like to go back and talk about 
the preamble to this,” Golden said. “Because had not Secretary Babbitt come out with 
this big plan to make a lot of national monuments throughout the West, the Steens, I 
don’t think, would have ever come to a real head.”
Golden spoke o f August 1999, when the Secretary and Oregon Governor John 
Kitzhaber stopped by Bums and Steens Mountain in an effort to resolve the long-standing 
requests for designation o f the mountain. After visiting Steens, the Secretary pronounced 
it a “primb resource o f national importance” (Bemton 1999). But the mountain was just 
one stop on Babbitt’s tour of the West, the purpose o f which was to create a “short list” 
o f places to be considered for national monument designation. David Blackstun of the 
Bums District BLM put it this way: “As the current administration comes to an end, the 
opportunities for special designation of Steens Mountain have again become ripe.” 
Blackstun referred to what is now being called the “Clinton Land Legacy”—a legacy that
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some feel began with the designation o f Utah’s Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument in 1996. In an article in the Bend, Oregon, Bulletin (Witty 1999), Senator 
Gordon Smith o f Oregon bluntly opined, “This is an administration in search o f a legacy. 
The legacy they have now is not an honorable one.”
Rather than declaring Steens a park or a monument, Secretary Babbitt indicated 
that he would support a National Conservation Area (NCA), designated through 
congressional action and local involvement. In the end, Steens became neither a 
monument nor an NCA, but at the outset people believed they would have to accept 
either one or the other. National Conservation Areas are an established, though seldom- 
used, form of land designation. The first NCA, King Range in California, was created in 
1970, and places like the more familiar Nevada’s Red Rock Canyon and Idaho’s Birds of 
Prey followed in 1990 and 1993. The BLM’s definition o f an NCA is “an area o f the 
public lands managed by the BLM which has been established by Congress for the 
purpose o f protecting and conserving identified resource values o f National interest” 
(BLM 1999).
Stacy Davies’ definition was a bit more simplified. “When they first brought this 
up, we looked hard at a national conservation area as a solution,” he explained, “and the 
more we looked at it, the more we decided that a NCA in ten years will be the same thing 
as a monument. What’s going to happen is that Rand McNally is going to figure out that 
it’s a new name for a unique place and it will end up on the map.” Locals wanted to keep 
Steens as a relatively unknown, undesignated tract o f public land; they didn’t want a 
national “anything,” with an inevitable increase o f tourists in their backyard. But
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everyone seemed to know that things would not stay the same; change had been set in 
motion years before Babbitt stood on the mountain.
According to the BLM’s David Blackstun, Babbitt addressed the viability o f well- 
managed grazing on Steens Mountain and said that he did not want to eliminate it.
Unlike many environmentalists, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber also supported 
continued grazing on the mountain. Kevin Smith, Kitzhaber’s Director of National 
Resources in Washington, D.C., said that the governor’s intention was not to change the 
economy o f the area but to protect the local character and economy. “We wanted to help 
the ranchers not lose their holdings,” he explained, “because they’re being bought out by 
folks who want to develop—put up condos and resorts, which can sometimes bring much 
higher prices and escalate land values.” Ranchers held at least one good card in their 
hands; both nationally and at the state level, their needs were addressed—at least to a 
certain point. Locals were encouraged to participate in the process o f determining the 
mountain’s future.
However, the Secretary also said that if the legislative effort was unsuccessful he 
would be willing to take matters into his own hands and recommend monument 
designation through executive order. “If Congress does not act, what I said, and what I 
reiterate, is that I will consider asking the president to use his power,” Babbitt told Hal 
Bemton o f the Portland Oregonian (Bemton 1999).
This explicit threat set the wheels in motion for a new brand o f politics, 
collaborative efforts, and natural resource debate. It originated in a complex legacy and 
was the result o f the ever-tense interactions between local and national interests. As 
Stacy Davies explained in frustration, “It’s unfortunate that land management and politics
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are two different things.” However different the land and bureaucracy may be, the two 
would not be separated on Steens Mountain. And in this regard the mountain was not 
alone.
On September 18,1996, while overlooking the Grand Canyon with A1 Gore, 
Robert Redford, Sierra Club President Adam Werbach, writer Terry Tempest Williams, 
and Bruce Babbitt (and without a single elected official from Utah), President Clinton 
made an announcement. “Seventy miles to the north o f here in Utah lies some o f the most 
remarkable land in the world. We will set aside 1.7 million acres o f it” (Clinton 1996). 
Just over seventy miles to the north, in the small town o f Escalante, the President and 
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt were hanged in effigy.
“I can’t believe that a president would do this and never walk on one square inch 
o f the land he’s designating,” said Utah House Speaker Mel Brown to the Salt Lake 
Tribune, “To my knowledge, he’s never even looked at it out the window o f Air Force 
One” (Harrie 1996). Clinton, indeed, avoided Utah—a state where he placed third, 
behind even Ross Perot, in the 1992 election. The dramatic panorama of the Grand 
Canyon’s South Rim provided a stunning backdrop for the designation o f the national 
monument, especially since the president was running neck-and-neck with Bob Dole in 
the 1996 race. Vice President A1 Gore introduced Clinton at the Grand Canyon ceremony 
as “the environmental president” and called the designation “a great monument to 
stewardship” (W oolf 1996).
Clinton had no chance o f winning Utah’s five electoral votes; but he had a good 
chance o f garnering the “green” vote outside o f Utah and the West. By the power granted
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to him by the Antiquities Act of 1906, President Clinton, with a stroke o f the pen, 
transformed an extensive tract of BLM land into a national monument. Clinton was 
acting well within his presidential rights. From its passage over ninety years ago until 
Clinton set aside Escalante, the Antiquities Act had been used on sixty-five occasions to 
designate or expand national monuments by every president except Nixon, Reagan, and 
George Bush (Judson 2000). Each time the act was used, a president was allowed 
freedom from compromise. He did not have to wrangle with public sentiment or 
congressional opinion in order to get his way. “I thank goodness that the Antiquities Act 
was on the books,” said Clinton on the South Rim, citing Bryce Canyon, Zion, Glacier 
Bay, Olympic, and Grand Teton National Parks as places forever preserved by presidents, 
without regard to party, for “all o f us and for generations to come” (Clinton 1996).
A few days after the President proclaimed the Grand Staircase-Escalante region a 
national monument, Kanab residents held an angry rally at the town’s high school. Many 
area businesses closed in recognition of the demonstration; the town was decorated in 
black balloons. Residents wore black ribbons, which they said signified the death of 
local rights. At the end of the rally, high school students released fifty o f those balloons, 
symbolizing, they claimed, the infringement o f federal power over the states (Associated 
Press 1999; Larmer 1996).
But in mid-January o f 2000, President Clinton again stood on the wind-whipped 
South Rim of the Grand Canyon and announced the creation o f another monument: the 
million-acre Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument in northwest Arizona. Once 
more, the President frustrated many locals. They, like the ranching families at Steens, 
saw the new designation as a flashing neon billboard that would draw thousands o f new
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visitors each year, forever changing the remote character of the area. But unlike 
Escalante, there were no black balloons, no effigies, no protests in the street. According 
to Lynn Alder, one reason for the paler response was that President Clinton chose “a 
kinder, gentler—though no less final—approach” (Alder 2000). Instead of surprising 
local ranchers and government officials, as he did at Escalante, Clinton hinted at the 
designation through Secretary Bruce Babbitt as early as May 1999. Furthermore, 
elaborates Alder, “instead o f dropping what some considered a political bombshell less
v
than two months before an election, Clinton made his announcement more than ten 
months before this lame-duck term ends.”
v
He also softened the blow by simultaneously announcing two other monuments 
and expanding another: Agua Fria in central Arizona, which protects a 71,000 acre area 
that contains one o f the most significant systems o f late prehistoric sites; the California 
Coastal National Monument, encompassing islands, reefs, rocks, and pinnacles 12 miles 
out from the state’s coastline; and the 7,680 acre expansion o f Pinnacles National 
Monument, originally designated by Theodore Roosevelt in 1908.
According to Paul Larmer, in another High Country News article, “the persistent 
political opposition to [Escalante] has convinced Bruce Babbitt to take a new tack. . .  Let 
the locals come up with a protection plan. If they don’t, he adds, he’ll ask the 
administration to unleash the Antiquities Act” (Larmer 1999). Which is exactly what he 
did on the Shivwits Plateau at what is now Parashant National Monument. The secretary 
proposed federal protection for a 550,000-acre strip o f land, but vowed from the start that 
locals would have a say in the matter. Federal designation would occur only if  they could 
not reach consensus through legislation. In a plot line similar to the script for Steens
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Mountain, Babbitt attended town hall meetings and sought the support o f local and state 
government officials and ranchers.
Attempting to head off national monument designation, Republican Senator Jon 
Kyi and Representative Bob Stump introduced separate bills that would create a Shivwits 
Plateau National Conservation Area. But Stump’s bill brought the possibility o f paved 
roads and required a comprehensive mineral survey within two years. The Secretary was 
quick to slam it at a congressional hearing in October 1999. “Several features o f this 
legislation actually weakened protections in existing law,” he said (Alder 2000). Senator 
Kyi’s bill was more congruent with Babbitt’s vision, but attracted little attention and went 
nowhere. In the end, Babbitt waltzed Clinton to the rim o f the Grand Canyon once more, 
and locals’ suspicions were confirmed. Like the empty comer o f southeastern Oregon, 
the empty comer of the desert Southwest suddenly got a lot o f attention.
The story didn’t end in Arizona. Many places throughout the West were 
spotlighted during the last year of Clinton’s presidency.
In April 2000, Clinton gave national monument status to thirty-four groves of 
giant sequoias (328,000 acres) in the Sequoia National Forest o f California’s Sierra 
Nevada. On June 9, 2000, the president created four more monuments: Canyons o f the 
Ancients, a 164,000-acre monument in the Four Comers region o f Colorado; Cascade- 
Siskiyou, 52,000 acres located at the convergence of the Klamath and Cascade Mountains 
in southern Oregon; the Ironwood Forest, 129,000 acres located 25 miles northwest o f 
Tucson, Arizona; and the Hanford Reach, 195,000 acres in south central Washington that 
straddle one of the last free-flowing stretches o f the Columbia River—a critical area for 
spawning salmon (Hansen 2000; Hanscom and Matthews 2000). For at least a year,
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Babbitt had talked about monument recommendations for most o f these places with local 
officials and residents—a feet most Republican Congressmen conveniently forget when 
complaining about Clinton’s “last minute” land grabs.
Dialogue with local communities about Canyons o f the Ancients began in spring 
o f 1999 and resulted in numerous Resource Advisory Committee meetings as well as 
NCA legislation introduced by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell. At the request of local 
community groups, Babbitt visited the area surrounding Cascade-Siskiyou, returned 
again with Congressman Greg Walden, and held two subsequent roundtable meetings. 
with community representatives. The Hanford Reach of the Columbia had been the focus 
o f attention—as possible designation as a Wild and Scenic River—since 1994, and 
Senator Patty Murray asked Babbitt to consider the area for monument designation in 
early 2000. And the Pima County Board o f Supervisors forwarded a resolution to the 
Secretary in March 2000, seeking national monument designation for the Ironwood 
Forest. Babbitt said that he would have preferred congressional action for many of these 
areas, but “it’s the protection that’s important, not the label” (Kelley 2000).
The campaign of protection continued. July 7,2000, Anderson Cottage: President 
Lincoln’s summer’s retreat. November 9,2000, Vermillion Cliffs National Monument: 
293,000 acres within the Paria Plateau in Arizona. November 9, 2000: boundary 
enlargement to 661,287 acres o f Craters of the Moon National Monument, Idaho (since 
1924 the monument had been enlarged by four other presidential proclamations). On 
January 17,2001 (a few weeks before George W. Bush was sworn in), Clinton declared 
seven more monuments and expanded an eighth. By the end o f his tenure, the president 
had put more than 5.6 million acres under administrative protection. The final seven
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included the Upper Missouri River Breaks (377,000 acres along 149 miles o f the river in 
Montana); Pompeys Pillar, where Captain William Clark carved his name and date (51 
acres along the Yellowstone River in Montana); Carrizo Plain (204,00 acres in 
California); Sonoran Desert (486,000 acres in Arizona); Kasha-Katuwe Tent Rocks (7 
million year old volcanic rocks in New Mexico); Minidoka Internment National 
Monument (a World War II-era Japanese-American internment camp in south-central 
Idaho); U.S. Virgin Island Coral Reef National Monument (more than 12,000 acres of 
submerged lands off St. John); and the expansion o f Buck Island Reef National 
Monument (now includes 18,000 marine acres off St. Croix) (Holland 2001).
Many o f these new monuments received positive reactions—from 
conservationists and even local and state officials. During the initial stages, many 
involved collaborative processes, which included local interests, public hearings, and 
input from the BLM’s Resource Advisory Councils. In an interview with Ed Marston, 
Babbitt explained that the administration made a concerted effort not to replicate the 
Escalante scenario. “We tried hard to make it up, and let me say that every other one of 
the twenty national monuments has been preceded by my personal presence on the 
ground, and a considerable sort of process, discussion with all stakeholders” (Babbitt 
2001). That didn’t stop the controversy. Montana’s Republican-controlled legislature 
went so far as to pass a resolution, largely symbolic, opposing the Missouri River 
designation. State Representative John Witt proclaimed the day Clinton made the 
announcement as “Black Wednesday” (Associated Press 2001). And according to some, 
the means didn’t quite justify the end. Ken Sizemore, deputy director o f the Five
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Counties Association of Government in southern Utah, claimed the new, “local” 
approach was as “draconian” as the old one.
“The administration is making the same mistake with these new areas,” Sizemore 
asserted (Larmer 1999). “Sure, it would be great to have a local, legislative proposal 
drive the process, but when you get down to brass tacks, the administration opposes the 
concepts and precepts embodied in locally produced legislation.” This may be the case. 
Or it may be that examples like Parashant only serve to illustrate Bill Marlett’s belief: if 
given the opportunity, locals will tend to look towards their own short-term economic 
interests over the interests of the land. Federal intervention is necessary. Locally 
produced legislation will always be tainted with greed. Either way the process is 
considered, Babbitt’s strategy seemed to fall short o f a genuine relinquishment of power. 
Though the carrot looked like a tempting offering, it was not an unconditional gift—tied 
as it was to the Antiquities Act.
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VI
Collaboration, Cowboys, and Environmentalists
Years ago, when I still lived in western Oregon, I’d drive past Steens Mountain on 
my way to the canyons of Utah—to Grand Staircase-Escalante specifically. Back then, I 
couldn’t have foreseen how the two places would be linked. But now each landscape is a 
bookend supporting volumes o f the Clinton administration’s legacy. The story began 
with those redrock canyons I’ve spent weeks exploring and came to a close with a 
mountain I’m only beginning to discover. Yet Babbitt approached Steens differently than 
Escalante and other recently designated national monuments. The mountain stands 
practically alone in a flurry o f presidential proclamations—almost as solitary as it stands 
in the sprawling expanse of the Oregon High Desert—for many different reasons: 
politics, geography, the character and vision of key stakeholders, and timing.
Sybil Ackerman, who represented environmentalists in the Steens Working 
Group, gave me one reason why. Ackerman told me that the main difference between 
Escalante and Steens is that “Oregon has a great governor and senators like Ron Wyden. 
Babbitt has to do a different approach here. In Utah, Clinton didn’t care. In Oregon, he 
has to worry about state politics.” To an environmentally minded secretary, names like 
Representative Pete DeFazio, Senator Ron Wyden, and Governor John Kitzhaber (who 
came out in support of dam removal on the lower Snake and is known for his progressive 
thinking on other environmental issues), can’t be ignored—especially during efforts to 
pave the way for A1 Gore’s run at the presidency. Still, Babbitt cut Oregon no slack in the 
designation o f the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument in the southwestern part o f the 
state. Why did Steens Mountain end up so differently? There is no pat answer, no
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overriding statement that can be made, except that the situation was complex, unique, and 
ripe.
It wasn’t just the presence of key Democrats that may have influenced Babbitt’s 
approach. According to Kevin Smith, director o f Governor Kitzhaber’s Natural Resource 
office in Washington, D.C., Republican Senator Gordon Smith and Democratic Senator 
Ron Wyden have a strong history o f bipartisan cooperation, especially on natural 
resource and environmental issues. Representative Greg Walden, the primary sponsor of 
the legislation, may have seen an opportunity to take advantage o f a mutual respect found 
throughout the Oregon delegation to come up with an alternative to a monument.
‘I ’ll give my theory,” said Smith. “A lot o f legislation, it’s a human endeavor. 
With the personalities involved in the Steens Mountain Project—you had a group o f 
people, a delegation, and a governor who felt comfortable working with one another.
And I think Secretary Babbitt saw that there was a reasonable group o f people that, with a 
little prodding, could perhaps move something through Congress.” Smith also thought 
that Babbitt’s patience with the course o f the legislation may have stemmed from an even 
more basic human level, his friendship with Governor Kitzhaber. “I think the governor 
probably—and Peter might know better than I—but the governor probably reassured the 
secretary that we ought to give this a try.”
“Absolutely,” agreed Peter Green, who is Governor Kitzhaber’s forestry advisor 
and staff member who deals with public lands. I was lucky enough to comer both Green 
and Smith together in Portland in early November, after the legislation had been signed 
by the president. During the Steens process, Peter Green and Kevin Smith had worked as 
a tag team: Green was on the ground in Oregon, negotiating with environmentalists,
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ranchers, and local government while Smith had day-to-day access to congressional 
members and their staff in Washington. Both worked continuously, prodding the 
negotiations along. “I’ll just echo what Kevin said,” Green continued. “Babbitt did it 
this way in Oregon, because he could. There were times when the governor reassured 
him, and there’s a lot o f mutual respect there, that this could be done.” But Green also 
speculated that doing it “this way in Oregon” had to be put in a larger context. There was 
motivation to show that, through cooperative effort, things could happen in the Clinton 
administration. “I hope this doesn’t sound cynical, but I think that because there were 
these other monuments going on, the administration had to show that there were ways to 
protect land without invoking the Antiquities Act.”
Others have thought the same and not disqualified their opinion as cynical.
Harney County Commissioner Dan Nichols guessed, “Secretary Babbitt—this is purely 
speculation—decided they better pick one spot, and let one local community come up 
with some valid options to save the administration’s face politically.”
Still others said working to avoid monument designation was purely practical.
The BLM’s Bums District Field Manager; Miles Brown, feels that the amount o f private 
land on the mountain automatically makes things different. When the administration 
looked at that land and saw that it had “over half o f all the streams, meadows, and prime 
habitat, they knew that just declaring a monument may not be the way to go,” he said.
But many hold a more optimistic view. Not only are there “conservation- 
minded,” politically savvy ranchers like Stacy Davies on the mountain, but there is a long 
history o f cooperation and collaboration. And if Sybil Ackerman was right when she told 
me, “I think Babbitt cares about these collaborative processes,” then he must have had
55
reason to think that it could really work, and for the best, at Steens. Even Nichols admits 
that, because o f continued collaborative efforts on the mountain, the secretary may have 
been willing to stick his neck out to allow Oregonians to work through a process. An 
established constituency already existed. It wasn’t hard to get people involved in what 
everyone considered to be the crown jewel o f southeastern Oregon. And the first people 
Babbitt asked to tackle some of the toughest questions about the management of the 
mountain were part o f the Southeast Oregon Resource Advisory Committee.
Resource Advisory Councils (RACs) were established in August 1995 to provide 
the public an opportunity to advise both the Bureau o f Land Management and the U.S. 
Forest Service on a broad array o f resource issues facing the agencies.
The Bums District, which encompasses Steens Mountain, is served by the Southeastern 
Oregon Resource Advisory Council (SEORAC). According to the BLM, the RACs 
operate on principles o f collaboration and consensus. “Council members are sought who 
are committed to working with other interests for the long-term benefit of public land and 
national forests” (BLM 2001). Each council is made up o f fifteen members representing 
a wide array o f interests: commodity, environmental and resource conservation, and other 
governmental organizations (Native American tribes, state and local governments, and 
academicians involved in natural sciences). Miles Brown approached the SEORAC and 
asked the group to consider future management on the mountain. The members accepted 
the challenge and tackled the issue through extensive discussion and debate among 
themselves as well as public meetings in Bend and Frenchglen. But the culmination o f 
the group’s effort was a report recommending no changes on the mountain.
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Mike Golden flipped through the RAC report, which had been completed m 
October o f 1999. “When Secretary Babbitt first came out,” Golden looked up and said, 
“he asked us to put this RAC report together on the Steens. But when we took the 
information back to him, the recommendation in the report was for no legislation on 
Steens Mountain.” In a letter accompanying the RAC report, Golden wrote “the 
subcommittee witnessed essentially two conflicting points o f view during its public 
hearings and in the end, as individual RAC members tried to represent the views o f their 
constituencies, we reflected those differences in our own deliberations.” In the short six 
months they had to deliberate, the RAC determined that current management programs 
were working on the mountain and recommended that there should be no designation o f a 
national park or monument. The members could not agree to support legislative 
designation as a national conservation area either. Instead, they left open the option for a 
cooperative management program on the mountain and encouraged the formation of a 
broad-based management team of users and landowners.
That didn’t fly with Babbitt. Golden said that the Secretary told him that even 
though the RAC didn’t want legislation, legislation had to be a part of the proposal. At 
that point, Babbitt decided that the real stakeholders needed to get around the table in 
order to make a deal—meaning, essentially, the landowners and conservationists. So the 
Secretary asked Golden if he would chair the Steens Working Group (SWG)—put 
together by Golden, Representative Walden, Senator Smith, and Governor Kitzhaber. He 
agreed, and the group o f six representatives (environmental, ranching, RAC, tribal, local 
government, and recreation) were given two months to develop recommendations for 
legislative concepts regarding Steens Mountain. They were asked to concentrate on
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issues that the SEORAC could not address or reach a decision on. “Keep in mind,” 
Golden said, “we were tackling questions that nobody else could come up with answers 
to.”
Strength often lies in diversity, and from the outset, the Steens Working Group 
seemed to represent a wide array o f interests. Yet, according to some, the group suffered 
from artificial construction. Because participating members were appointed, biases were 
embedded in the process. “When we got to the environmental community, we pushed for 
several people,” Mike Golden told me. “But Representative Walden’s office said 
absolutely we will not accept Bill Marlett, and we won’t accept Andy Kerr. They put 
their foot down.” Though Marlett has been perhaps the most active environmentalist on 
the Steens issue, it was felt that he would never come to a compromise. This belief may 
have seemed accurate at the time. When I talked to Marlett shortly after the SWG 
produced its final report in January, 2000,1 asked him what he thought about 
collaboration. He responded, quietly and firmly, “I think it’s a waste o f time. It’s just 
not that productive. Litigation is the only form where we have been able to level the 
playing field.” Nonetheless, Marlett said if given the opportunity, he would have sat 
down at the table.
As it turned out, that was exactly what was needed. And it is exactly what 
happened—eventually. The Steens Working Group might have benefited from the 
process of working through Marlett’s strongly held beliefs—or compromise may have 
become even more unattainable. At any rate, both he and Andy Kerr ended up 
counseling Sybil Ackerman, the designated environmental representative, every night 
after the group met.
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Ackerman described feeling isolated at the table. She asserted that the 
representation sounded like a good balance, but the recreation representative wasn’t 
environmental at all. “He represented the ORV people,” she said. “They could have just 
as easily let the Sierra Club represent recreation and Oregon Natural Desert Association 
represent the environmentalists. It would have created a better balance.” It’s safe to say 
that the Sierra Club is as much an environmental organization as it is a backpacker’s club, 
but it’s also easy to imagine that Ackerman is not exaggerating her situation. It must 
have been difficult at the table, surrounded by a Harney County Commissioner, a 
representative for the Oregon Hunters’ Association, a rancher—everyone except 
Ackerman was from central or southeast Oregon, and to some degree, sympathetic to 
local needs. “In these groups,” she told me, “it’s important to have two people back each 
other up.”
As it stands, the Working Group report reflects the extreme polarization that took 
place. Instead o f reaching consensus on any o f the issues (which included the boundary, 
wilderness, grazing, development, transportation and access, and recreation), the group 
produced several alternatives. In most cases, Ackerman stood alone behind each of her 
proposals. Even without Marlett, there was no compromise. The most graphic 
representation of this is the boundary issue. The report presented four different 
alternatives for the Steens legislative boundary, ranging from Ackerman’s environmental 
proposal at 1,202,930 acres (including 263,410 acres private land) to Davies’ landowner 
proposal at 33,199 acres (0 acres private land).
“Sybil and the cowboys each drew their line in the sand, and we almost didn’t 
have another meeting,” Golden explained. When it came time to discuss the boundary,
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Stacy Davies put the 33,000-acre boundary down, and Ackerman laid her 1.2 million- 
acre boundary on the table. “And you would expect some negotiation,” said Davies. But 
according to Davies, Ackerman never decreased the size of her boundary, even as others 
increased theirs. The issue became gridlocked. “At that point, the rest o f it was a waste 
of time. What it turned out to be from then on was an avenue to get your idea to the 
secretary in writing, and that’s where it stayed,” Davies explained.
“I wasn’t going to come to anything less than Babbitt was asking for,” Ackerman 
said, and Davies describes her position in the same way: The environmentalists drew the r 
biggest boundary they felt they could justify and stayed there. “They played the politics 
out and said Babbitt is willing to go to 1.2 million acres. They were in no position to 
negotiate at all, and so it put us in the position o f just give, give, give,” Davies 
complained. He felt that the environmentalists stood to win whether a successful 
compromise was reached or not.
Many months after the SWG process, I sat stiffly on a velvet couch in Dan 
Nichols’ Victorian parlor—inside a house that belonged to his wife’s family for four 
generations. I had missed his driveway in the dark, drove miles beyond the town of 
Diamond before realizing it, and showed up almost an hour late. It felt awkward 
invading his private space at such an hour. The windows were thrown open to let in a 
cool October night. An intricately carved banister led up winding stairs. The wallpaper 
filled the dimly lit room with antique flower patterns. The county commissioner before 
me might have been a member o f the first generation that lived in this house, with his 
handlebar moustache, closely cropped hair, neat-fitting button down shirt, and boots.
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Nichols was a member of the Steens Working Group and expressed appreciation for 
Babbitt creating it and allowing him to participate. But he was frustrated at the lack of 
consensus and what he saw as Sybil Ackerman’s lack o f cooperation. He looked straight 
at me, unwavering, and said, ‘There were five people who basically agreed on a concept, 
and one individual kept saying, ‘No, can’t go there.’ Repeatedly stated, ‘No, can’t do 
that. No, can’t go there.’ We were initially selected to go in and give and take, come up 
with a compromise. And ‘no, can’t go there’ isn’t even remotely a compromising 
position.”
Many observers speculated that environmentalists were playing the situation to 
their advantage. Lack of consensus in the Working Group meant it might be tougher to 
reach consensus as a bill was drafted and negotiated. If the legislative effort proved 
unsuccessful, then Babbitt might have to demonstrate that his threats were not idle and 
unleash the Antiquities Act. And a national monument is what environmentalists had 
been calling for, and what locals feared the most, all along.
Part o f the issue, according to Miles Brown, was that no one really wanted to lay 
all their cards on the table. “Because once you did, those cards would never come off the 
table. Everybody knows what you’re willing to give.” But after the SWG process failed 
to reach consensus, the ranchers—through Representative Walden—would lay their 
biggest card on the table: a cattle-free wilderness. That one act changed the entire 
process, including environmentalists’ commitment to negotiation.
Yet during the SWG talks, all o f this was hidden. Given such circumstances, 
combined with an inadequate period o f time to work in, it is no wonder that the Steens 
Working Group was unsuccessful in coming up with a cohesive management plan. In the
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end, it is hard to say that the locals were allowed a fair shot at involvement. Any sort o f 
collaborative effort was denied organic origins, an ability to grow from the ground up. 
People came to the table for different reasons; they did not have to struggle through their 
differences in order to address a common problem. The playing field was not level. This 
brings Babbitt’s “kinder approach” into question. How can collaboration work when it’s 
mandated, when it originates from the top and is pushed down and, subsequently, 
becomes fragmented at the community level? Can it even be considered collaboration at 
all? It is a question I shall come back to—a question that dominates the framework of the 
process, encompasses the plot o f the story, and upon which almost everyone had an 
opinion.
In March, I asked Golden what has happened since the Steens Working Group 
handed in its final report in January 2000. He looked suddenly exasperated. “Once we 
walked out o f the door after our meeting with the Secretary—and with their promises to 
keep us informed and thanking us for what we did there—nobody has said one word to us 
or let us know what’s going to happen,” he said. “And the BLM in Bums is calling me 
and asking if I’ve heard anything . . .  I don’t know where they are, and I don’t know what 
the conflicts are.”
When I posed the same question to Bill Marlett—again, this was six months 
before the final agreement came together—he said he hadn’t heard much besides rumors. 
“What I do know is they’re not reaching consensus very quickly. And that’s fine with us. 
Any consensus reached with Gordon Smith and Greg Walden is not going to be good for 
the mountain. We’d rather see a monument. We won’t get any wilderness, but that’s 
fine.”
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VII
A Balance of Power
Little did Marlett know, but by the end o f the summer 2000, he would be working 
towards that very consensus with those Oregon Republicans and ranchers. There came a 
point in the deliberations when environmentalists realized that they might get something 
more through a legislative process. “How do you reconcile that they [the ranchers] were 
afraid o f a national monument, and they feel like they got something better—and yet we 
feel that we got something better than a national monument?’ asked Andy Kerr. The 
designation o f Steens Mountain as a national monument would certainly set some 
boundaries as to what activities could or couldn’t take place. It would provide a higher 
level o f protection and preservation than the current management o f the land. But many 
of the important details would be left to a management plan—ultimately written by the 
BLM. Environmentalists began to wonder if they might have more say if they 
participated in the writing o f the legislation, instead o f fighting it.
When a draft o f the bill began circulating early that summer—a draft that 
included large tracts of designated wilderness, part o f it cattle-free, and massive land 
trades (possibilities that weren’t even discussed by the Steens Working Group)—the 
Steens- Alvord Coalition, a consortium o f state, local, and national environmental groups, 
knew that it might be worth their time to consider the bill. Importantly, environmentalists 
would continue to hold a position of power—the ability to negotiate for more and stall or 
even kill the bill if  they were unhappy. “One phone call from me or a letter from the 
coalition to the delegation would have killed this bill flat,” declared Bill Marlett. “Of
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course,” he admitted, “the same holds true from the ranchers. They could have done the 
same thing.”
Congressman Walden and his constituents in the ranchers did hold that same 
power, along with another. They had made the wise move to develop legislation that 
looked better to conservationists than a monument. They had set an enticing table.
When it began to look like the Steens Working Group would fail, Representative 
Walden, Lindsay Slater, and other staff members, along with Stacy Davies and other 
ranchers, began to quietly piece together a proposal. “We started the first draft,” Lindsay 
Slater, Walden’s legislative assistant (now Chief of Staff for Representative Mike 
Simpson o f Idaho), told me in a phone conversation from his Washington D.C. office. 
“And we went to Mr. DeFazio first with it—for the wilderness and cow free wilderness. 
And we just started pitching it very slowly to try to get people to take us seriously. And 
once we had a little buy in, we started writing the bill.” The bill became the template that 
people worked from through July. During that time, it was subject to continual 
reworking, a flurry o f endless phone conversations, faxes, weekly meetings, and constant 
checking between politicians and their constituencies.
The field o f players broadened substantially: Babbitt’s staff Governor 
Kitzhaber’s office, Senator Wyden and his aides, Representative DeFazio, Representative 
Blumenauer. Everybody wanted something—something altered, something included, 
something deleted. Legislative staff and the governor’s staff would take responsibility 
for different elements—the boundary, wilderness, development. Peter Green, Governor 
Kitzhaber’s forestry advisor, explained, “They would go to each o f us and ask what we 
needed. And we’d argue for months for more development language . . .  and then they’d
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go to Wyden, and Wyden was arguing for more wilderness so they had to give, give, 
give.”
Stacy Davies expressed frustration with these compromises: “We’d negotiate with 
Bill Marlett and Andy Kerr, and then the Sierra Club and Audubon Society would come 
and want something. And so you’d give them what they wanted, and then the national 
Wilderness Society, national Sierra Chib would come and want something. And then the 
governor would come and want something, and Representative Miller out of California 
would come and want something, and so we ran out of things to give.”
That giving was inevitable, according to Green and Smith, because Walden’s 
office developed the first draft. “When you do that, everybody is going to take shots at 
it,” said Smith. “And if it doesn’t include everything that other people want, which o f  
course it didn’t—there’s no way you can possibly do that—you reset the basic instrument 
from which everybody is going to ask for changes.” If Wyden had come out with the 
first draft, with a huge wilderness overlay, it would have been “cutting away in reverse.” 
According to these two members o f Kitzhaber’s staff, the biggest mistakes 
Walden made were not negotiating with everyone at once, and, more importantly, 
excluding the environmentalists until almost August. “And we, o f course, kept saying 
you need to talk to them. Eventually they went to talk to them and had to give, give, give 
again,” explained Green. “What did they think they were going to do, just agree to it?’ 
Needless to say, they didn’t. There was much opposition to the bill introduced by 
Congressmen Walden and Blumenauer to the House Committee on Resources and 
Committee on Agriculture on July 12, 2000. Members from other states were doubtful. 
National environmental groups had substantial concerns. And to make matters worse,
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there was little support from conservationists and the delegation at home. Though 
Wyden and DeFazio spoke o f their conceptual support o f the legislation, they said 
changes would be necessary in order to gain their full support. It soon became obvious 
the bill had a low probability o f passing. Babbitt continued to rattle his saber. Across the 
West, the list o f monuments was growing.
‘The bill, as introduced, sucked,” wrote Kerr in a letter to his constituents. “It 
had numerous provisions that were not supportable in any form, including exceptions to 
the Wilderness Act and other bad things.” Those “bad things,” according to the 
environmentalists, included a purpose statement that did not ensure conservation as the 
primary and overriding purpose, unacceptable language regarding juniper management in 
wilderness and wilderness study areas, and the compensation o f private landowners for 
non-development easements. These and other provisions were eventually eliminated, 
compromises that were disheartening to ranchers. But, echoing Green and Smith’s 
sentiment, Marlett explained, “the fact is, it was their bill, it was their design. . .  they 
were the ones that set up the board upon which we played this game. They set the bar, 
not us, and our job was to raise that bar.” Conservationists did raise it, but not without 
some give and take—and not as the bill had been negotiated before. A core group o f four 
people pounded out a deal behind closed doors. Stacy Davies explained how it came 
about:
“Then finally, late August, we got close enough that—I don’t even know how it 
happened but, they made Bill Marlett, Andy Kerr, and Fred and I get in a room together 
and hammer it out. Finalize it.”
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“We had to have people there that could make a decision on the spot. And it was 
good. It’s amazing how far Fred Otley and Bill Marlett can get drinking beer in front of 
the truck,” commented Lindsay Slater.
“People who had been excluded from the working group last December because 
they couldn’t get along, suddenly they were closing the deal. There’s a lesson right there 
. . .  They came back and there was this new map. And people were liking the bill,” 
recalled Peter Green.
Many o f those I talked to saw, in retrospect, the whole process as leading up to 
the negotiations among these four. Bill Marlett and Andy Kerr were previously excluded 
from the discussions—could only comment on what was previously discussed—because 
of their uncompromising reputations. Maybe it was because time was running out. 
Maybe there was too much at stake to let the effort die. But with occasional assistance 
from Lindsay Slater, Senator Wyden’s Bend field representative David Blair, and the 
BLM’s Miles Brown, these men quickly struck a balance o f power that carried the 
legislation to a unanimous voice vote on the House floor.
“If you look at it,” suggested Miles Brown, “it’s just a progression o f getting 
closer and closer to the real people that needed to be involved to make a deal. You 
evolve from the Southeast Oregon Resource Management Plan, where we [the agency] 
gather information and go into a black box, and then we come back out and everybody 
pukes all over it. You go from that end o f it, and then you gravitate to the RAC, which 
gets a little closer, but there’s still outside folks. And then you go to the Steens Working 
Group, which got a little closer. And then you go to Washington and set some
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sideboards. And then you get to the real deal makers, and that was Andy and Bill and 
Stacy and Fred.”
One o f reasons the negotiations worked so well was because o f the mixed 
chemistry o f their personalities, which brought the legislation down to a very human 
level.
Fred Otley: funny, easy-going, experienced in political matters, a fourth 
generation rancher at Steens. “Fred Otley is the old family,” said Miles Brown. He held 
a strong and ongoing trust from the ranchers.
Stacy Davies: charismatic, quick-witted, with a capacity for remembering the 
smallest o f details. Davies had the backing o f the Sanders family, millionaires who gave 
him the freedom and trust to do what was best for the Roaring Springs Ranch—the 
largest on the mountain. “Stacy was key,” explained Brown. “Stacy Davies has a way of 
relating to a lot o f different people . . .  And he’s one of those people—their ranch is 
willing to mature, they’re willing to change, and he’s kind o f led the way on that.” Three 
years before, Davies put together a conservation agreement with the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and BLM on Roaring Springs. The community was skeptical. But he 
proved a rancher could work with federal agencies.
“Stacy would come and he knew exactly what the situation was, and he’s just 
boom, boom, boom, boom, go down the line and lay it out on the line,” recalled Otley. 
“And that saved the bill, ahh, so many times because o f his capacity to cut out all the 
excess crap and focus on the achievable, fundamental things that were fair.”
Bill Marlett: serious, relentless, detail-oriented. Marlett brought an intimate 
knowledge of the mountain and the buy-in o f the local environmental community. Inch-
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for-inch, pound-for-pound, Marlett moved up and down the map, gaining wilderness by 
40 acres here and there.
“Sometime you just had to walk away while Bill sat there negotiating acre-by- 
acre on the map. The rest o f us had to go out and smoke cigarettes on the porch and take 
a break,” explained Brown.
N
Andy Kerr: respected lobbyist on the national and state level, one of Oregon’s 
best-known environmentalists, self-assured to the point some might call egotistical.
Miles Brown called him “the spin doctor,” and, in contrast to Marlett, “out there in the 
big concept stuff.” Otley observed that “he wasn’t so worried about the technical details 
and he knew what he wanted.” Brown stressed the importance of his credibility: “If 
Andy Kerr says it’s good, then people believe it’s good. If Andy Kerr goes back to 
Washington and talks to congressionals and says this is a good thing, they’re going to 
listen to him.”
“Andy, he’s an interesting character,” observed Fred Otley. “At least he 
accurately portrays himself. He says he’s arrogant and hateful and loves to make people 
mad. And he said, ‘This is the first time I’ve been nice to you guys and it probably won’t 
happen again.’”
It just worked. They were the people that mattered. They built a certain level of 
trust. They even joked. And they were able to negotiate directly rather than rely on 
politicians’ aides to broker a deal.
I asked Peter Green what he thought of the personality dynamics of these four 
men. I explained what I had heard about the intense negotiations and the equipoise that 
somehow emerged.
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“I like what you say, it’s kind o f like the Beatles,” Green admitted, though he had 
a different take. “But what I would say is that I’m not so sure they were so important in 
the room. They were the perfect combination to bring in the needed constituencies . . .  
because they brought the right people to bear, they needed to be in on that deal. You see 
the subtle difference I’m talking about?’
I did, but also figured one element was an integral part of the other. And then I 
started thinking how all the pieces somehow fell together—at every level. There was a 
Democratic administration that wanted some sort o f special designation and brought the 
threat o f a monument. There was a Republican Congress that wouldn’t pass a bill that 
didn’t have the support o f the landowners. A Republican congressman from Oregon—a 
minority in his state—introduced the bill. Environmentalists, the Democratic governor, 
and the rest o f the Oregon Democratic delegation were able to balance the legislation out 
and make it credible. Everything ripened at once.
“In the end,” Lindsay Slater told me, “everybody was fighting for the bill, which 
was really nice. There was finally a point where I felt like, wow, now everybody is on 
our side fighting for this thing, rather than trying to kill it to get a monument. When I 
reached that point I knew we were going to get it.”
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VIII
What They Could Not Walk Away From
From the top of the cirque, the track o f the glacier is obvious. The U-shaped 
gorge heads north and then swings gently to the left. The glacier scraped through the 
land 10,000 years ago. The floor, splashed golden by aspen and cottonwood clinging to 
the creek and springs, is nearly a half-mile below. Only the sky demarcates the clean, 
concave walls o f the gorge, brushed by erosion with faint lines that trace the wind and 
rain and gravity’s path.
Kiger Gorge is one of Steens’ most famous. The view from the top, accessible by 
car from the Steens Mountain Loop Road, is a physical lesson in the processes of 
geologic time and the movement o f glaciers. Pictures o f Kiger in the spring and early 
summer show the gorge softened with green and wildflowers. But when I first looked 
upon it in the beginning o f October, the Kiger Gorge was stripped by the heat o f summer, 
a rocky bowl tilted high in the desert. I quickly left the few late-season tourists at the 
pullout and interpretive sign and hiked towards the gorge’s famous notch—the 
mountain’s most distinguishing feature when viewed from the wildlife refuge. Following 
the edge o f a grassy headland, I scrambled up a ridge toward the eastern wall—relishing 
the opportunity to climb in a rocky, steep, exposed place. Locals call Kiger’s notch the 
gunsight, and when I sat within its frame, it seemed that I rode the great divide the 
mountain slices through the Oregon desert.
The flat, dry basin lay to the east; the curved plateau and hidden valleys o f the 
mountain rolled to the west. The Alvord Basin sank below the mountain like an empty 
bathtub, the remnants o f its once full prehistoric lake, now a dry, cracked, and vast
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playa—the color of milky tea. Even the horizon took on the dusty tones of the desert, 
diluted by the heat o f the land. Mann Lake formed an anomalous figure against the floor; 
from my vantage point it formed a puddle of forgiving blue that caught snowmelt off the 
steep eastern escarpment o f Steens. To the northwest, I could see further up the gorge, 
into the bend forced by the glacier and out to where it spilled open at the Diamond 
Valley. I had camped there the night before on Fred Otley’s ranch. Otley felt that the 
view o f Kiger Gorge rivaled that o f the Grand Canyon. But he was admittedly biased. 
The headwaters o f Kiger belonged to his family for generations—until they traded it 
away at the bargaining table only weeks earlier.
“That land we’re giving up is where all the kids shot their first elk. It’s our 
favorite part o f the ranch,” he said the previous afternoon. “I’m not sure how many years 
it will take before we get used to that being gone.”
“Do you have any idea why you decided to do it in the end?’ I asked. We sat on a 
hot afternoon in the coolness o f his parents’ home. Almost every inch o f the walls were 
covered by photos o f children, grandchildren, nephews, and nieces, who, at various 
points in their lives, inevitably donned cowboy hats. Otley had been late to meet me, and 
to compensate he brought a case o f beer. I didn’t object. We talked for a couple o f hours 
over cold PBR, which, on that dusty, sweltering Friday, tasted about perfect.
“There were two things,” Otley explained. “We put something there that would 
give us a possibility o f a piece o f legislation that would avoid a massive monument, 
which would effectively destroy everything that we’ve worked for so many years. A 
monument would have created a war zone.”
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The land his family has loved is primarily concentrated in the Diamond Valley. It 
first became familiar to them in 1886, when Fred Otley’s great-grandfather—also named 
Fred Otley—an accountant and raft man on the Mississippi, moved out west for the 
health o f his wife, who was sick with tuberculosis. Though she died in California shortly 
thereafter, Otley headed north to Malheur Lake, put a cattle operation together, and 
finished raising a family.
“It [the ranch] evolved as it was put together—a number of places over many 
years—and actually moved to this site in 1943 . . .  At one point there were actually seven 
Otley families. They all had boys. Girls weren’t allowed into the scenario o f things, I 
guess,” he said wryly and grinned at me. “Two families, seven boys. And the next 
generation had all boys too. We kind of broke down last generation and let a girl or two 
crowd in,” he laughed.
The Otley family amassed about 10,000 acres o f private land over the years, but 
that accounted for only half o f their operation. The other 50 percent was made up of 
public land grazing allotments. The Otleys became prominent figures throughout the 
community and within the industry. The gold and silver inscribed belt buckle Otley wore 
that day attested to the fact that he served for a time as president o f the Oregon 
Cattlemen’s Association, a powerful lobbying force in the state. Otley has also been 
involved in the special designation issue at Steens for years, heading up a local group 
called Friends of Steens Mountain and serving as private landowner liaison to the 
Resource Advisory Council.
The land trades, o f which the Kiger Gorge was only a part, were a key and 
controversial part o f the legislation. “We offered our land as icing on the cake to try to
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get this bill passed,” explained Otley. “We will probably get used to and enjoy the fact 
that certain o f our pastures will no longer be a combination o f public and private land, 
and that there’s a dry part o f our ranch where we’re going to be able to develop water. 
And we’re going to be able to implement a prescribed fire management plan without the 
government having to OK everything. So there’s certain inherent, tangible positives that 
we’re going to incur.” Still, Otley said he and his family we’re having a hard time 
balancing those positives with the loss o f Kiger Gorge.
Most environmentalists felt the exchanges were the bargaining chip that kept the 
ranchers at the table. “Some o f these ranchers were smart enough to figure out that their 
fixture was not in public lands grazing,” said Andy Kerr. “What is good for these land 
barons is that they made out fine. They were very fairly compensated for these lands. 
And they’re in a much better position to go about their grazing on private lands with less 
interference from the public.” But environmentalists may have wanted those trades just 
as badly, if  not more. Consolidating the high alpine, ecologically sensitive areas made 
sense from a conservation standpoint. “I’m not sure the bill would have gone through if 
there wasn’t a land trade,” said the BLM’s Miles Brown. “What you really got out of this 
bill is, one, you got wilderness designation, and the big thing the environmental 
community got—particularly ONDA—was a 95 percent cow-free Donner und Blitzen 
watershed. That’s what they’ve been after for a long time. To get that, you needed to 
remove the private land.”
That high-elevation, highly sensitive land, that grass that greens up after July, was 
the point around which negotiations revolved. The areas were key pieces to the ranchers’ 
successful operation. But once they decided to let some of it go, Fred Otley and Stacy
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Davies knew they had offered something that conservationists would have a hard time 
walking away from; they knew it was their best hope against a national monument 
designation. Any monument boundary would have encompassed quite a bit o f private 
ground in the high country, and some landowners had threatened to fence, develop, and, 
at minimum, forever retain that important land if they were forcibly enclosed by such 
administrative lines. “We made it clear that if a monument occurred, it wasn’t going to 
happen. It wouldn’t be on the table again,” explained Otley. “The acquiring o f those 
special lands, Ankle and Mud Creek, the head o f Kiger, were not going to the public, not 
going to the government. No way. It was kind o f a one shot deal. We were willing to 
put ‘er up if  everybody played fair. They weren’t going to have a second shot at it.”
The July bill circulating in the House of Representatives outlined six different 
land exchanges—including the Otley’s property in the Kiger, portions of Roaring Springs 
Ranch, and some property owned by the Witzels. But H.R. 4828 was receiving tentative 
support from many members of Congress as well as environmentalists. Support for the 
land exchanges, specifically, was even shakier. It was not until those focused 
negotiations described earlier—not until Davies, Otley, Marlett, and Kerr sat down and 
started pouring over maps and adjusting boundaries by 40 acres here and there—that the 
controversial elements o f the bill started to congeal into something passable. The right 
people were at the table and, as Kerr put it, able to “deliver” to their constituencies.
Fred Otley felt this bargaining was necessary and complimented Kerr and Marlett 
for their work. “The congressional folks’ support was somewhat tentative because o f the 
land ratios. And Andy and Bill did a good job o f going out there and looking at public 
values and then negotiating whether what we put on the table in terms o f land
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exchanges—and the public values that would be lost from the lands we would receive—  
was balanced. And they worked very hard at it, and I think it was fair and accurate.”
Whether those exchanges really were balanced was heavily disputed. At first 
glance, the bare bones of dollars and acreage made the trades look heavily skewed in 
favor o f the ranchers. Some even suggested that the public was being ripped off. In the 
end, Roaring Springs Ranch traded away 10,909 acres in exchange for 76,374 acres of 
public land and received $2,889,000 “to compensate for lost productivity and economic 
activity caused by the dislocation and reallocation o f resources and the disruption and 
termination o f traditional management techniques,” according to the bill that passed the 
House o f Representatives (U.S. House 2000a). Charlie Otley, Fred Otley’s uncle, traded 
851 acres o f his land in the Kiger Gorge for 3,845 acres o f low-lying areas and received 
$920,000 for economic adjustments. The Otley Brothers, Inc., Fred Otley’s outfit, 
received 6,881 acres in the Diamond Valley and $400,000 in exchange for his 505 acres 
in Kiger. Two other ranches together received approximately $950,000 in economic 
adjustments and 17,000 acres o f public land for about 6,400 acres of their private land on 
the mountain.
Money wasn’t the important issue to Andy Kerr and Bill Marlett. “In twenty 
years, nobody is going to remember $5 million in payments, but they will remember that 
this was the first designated cow-free wilderness area in the West. That’s what matters,” 
opined Marlett. To him, creating a cattle-free wilderness produced a value that couldn’t 
be bought or sold on the marketplace.
Nonetheless, there were quite a few skeptics. Dick Vander Schafif, Senior 
Conservation Planner with The Nature Conservancy in Portland, explained that the basic
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controversy regarding the exchanges were the cash settlement payments made to the 
ranchers to cover their economic losses. “The private and federal lands were exchanged 
on an equal market basis (even this is disputable), but then there were cash payments 
added on top o f this exchange deal to cover ranchers’ losses that resulted from high 
elevation private lands (late season forage) going out o f private ownership in exchange 
for low elevation (early season forage) federal lands.”
Critics continued to ask, why such weighted ratios? Why the extra money piled 
on top of the exchanges? “We took a lot of shit from our constituents from the net loss of 
public lands,” Andy Kerr told me in Portland. In September 2000, he sent out a general 
email on an environmental list serv in order to clarify and justify the core negotiators’ 
approach. In the note to his colleagues, Kerr explained that the appraisal process was 
expedited in order to keep time with the dynamic and evolving nature o f the legislation. 
And, instead o f going through a traditional appraisal process, the lands to be acquired 
were evaluated at their development value—because serious development potential 
existed.
“For the most part, conservationists get up every morning to protect values that 
the market doesn’t well, fairly, or adequately recognize. While there is obvious value in 
cow-free (and other) wilderness, in the improvement o f sage grouse and redband trout 
habitat by the elimination o f livestock, and in the prevention o f trophy homes at the head 
o f Kiger Gorge, the traditional appraisal process doesn’t take them into account,” he 
wrote.
Stacy Davies explained the trades another way: “You have an appraised value, 
and nothing on the open market ever trades for an appraised value. You have a market
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value, and market value is whatever you’re willing to pay, and I’m willing to sell. And 
what happened on Steens is a combination o f both. You’re dealing with priceless pieces 
o f land. Charlie Otley could have said the Kiger Gorge is worth $5,000 an acre, and I 
guarantee in ten years he’d get that. He sold it for $1300 an acre to the government. . .  
Basically, what it had to boil down to is that you had a rough appraisal done to say that 
we’re in the ball park. And then you had competent people on both sides that negotiated 
the deal—they cut a deal. And beyond that, what can you really do 7 ’
Consider, as well, that private land in terms o f those grazing leases, which had 
been capitalized into the value of the property. Consider the fact that ranchers were 
“technically” losing money on their private land with the loss o f public AUMs created by 
a cattle-free wilderness. Although this might seem like a strange and circuitous line of 
reasoning, it is a part o f ranching economics. Framed in this way, the weighted land 
ratios and economic adjustment make a little more sense.
Nonetheless, the economic adjustments to the ranchers were the hardest sell 
outside o f the negotiation process. But the environmentalists at the table understood that 
the ranchers would not trade without them. By giving up their late-summer forage in the 
higher elevations, the landowners incurred replacement costs—such as constructing water 
developments to mimic high mountain meadows. Andy Kerr thought the compensation 
entirely appropriate and “both socially just and politically necessary, if the legislation 
[was] to be enacted into law.”
Fred Otley and Stacy Davies told me it was not only appropriate, it was absolutely 
necessary. They would have had to pull the trades off the table without economic 
mitigation. The money was needed to revamp and make possible an economically viable
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operation. That might mean drilling a well, putting in a pivot, pumping the water, and 
creating manmade meadows; installing new fence; figuring in reduced carrying capacity; 
and finding ways to cope with the increased costs and decreased weight o f their calves. 
According to Otley, his calves make about 3.75 pounds per day on the high Steens in 
August, while a cow will gain from lA a pound to V* a pound in the low country. After the 
trades and the cattle-free designation, his company lost 504 o f those high country AUMS. 
He estimated this loss to equal $60,000 per year just in weight gains.
“If you’re looking at long-term, sustainable ranches, the thing that’s kept these 
ranches is the elevation—winter grazing to good summer grazing. It’s still green up 
high,” Stacy Davies told me in the beginning o f October. “Our cows that aren’t grazing 
the high country are thin and have light calves. They didn’t breed. But we had fifteen 
head up there this year. I brought them down the other day, and their calves are weighing 
over 600 pounds. And the cows are fat. . .  The expensive part o f a ranch is your winter 
feed. From a dollar input standpoint. But what makes you money is your summer feed.”
Andy Kerr and Bill Marlett accepted this. In their eyes, the costs o f the 
exchanges— less public land, a gross reduction in sage grouse habitat—were outweighed 
by the gains—more public land without livestock and a net gain for sage grouse habitat 
(ecologically important land was gained in the endangered mountain big sagebrush zone). 
The land up high was simply more valuable than the land down low—much o f which had 
already been heavily grazed, plowed, and planted. “There’s a net loss o f public lands, but 
there’s a net gain for the public interest, I would argue,” said Kerr. “We got cow-free 
wilderness, we got better habitat for sage grouse. If you want to look at it from a sage 
grouse, from a redband trout, from a big horn sheep perspective---those species are better
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off as a result of these exchanges and the subsequent legislation.” Because o f this, Kerr 
and Marlett felt the landowners weren’t benefiting unjustly at the expense of the public.
But there still remained the sticky issue o f California’s Democratic Congressman 
George Miller, who wouldn’t be satisfied just because a couple o f ranchers and 
environmentalists hammered out a deal that made both parties happy. Miller, the ranking 
Democratic member in the House Resources Committee, had just got hold o f a recent 
General Accounting Office report, which stated that taxpayers rarely get their money’s 
worth from land swaps. His presence became felt during the crafting of the bill, even 
though he wasn’t in the room with the delegation and the governor.
It took the support o f the entire Oregon delegation to sway him. According to 
Kevin Smith, Representative Peter DeFazio became the lynchpin in moving Miller to a 
place where the bill would be acceptable to a major block o f votes on the House floor. 
And Governor Kitzhaber and other Oregon Democrats reassured the California 
congressman that even though the overall public benefit was financially hard to quantify, 
ecologically, the land trades gave back much more than would have been received 
otherwise. The economic adjustments were only a minor debt in comparison to the value 
o f the high Steens.
In the end, both Peter Green and Kevin Smith felt that that the land exchanges 
were the strongest result o f the negotiation. “This isn’t going to get pulled apart because 
o f these land exchanges,” commented Green. “To me, this is a model because you’ve 
done two things. One, you’ve come to a place where there’s an agreement on the 
stalemate. But you’ve also rearranged all the pieces so that it can’t fall apart in seven 
years. You put the private land down low, where it’s not important ecologically, and you
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put the public land up high. You solve the long-term problem. And you've come to some 
deal. . .  And that’s why I think it’s so exciting; it’s resilient. It’s a model for doing 
things the right way.”
Did the ranchers think so? I asked Lindsay Slater, Representative Walden’s aid 
during the negotiations and legislative process. “I always said we were trading high 
resource values—the pristine glacier meadows up top—for the low-lying cow values. 
We’re getting the cows where they belong, and we’re locking up and blocking up the 
high resource values on top,” he said. I asked him if  the cattle industry was upset that the 
legislation set a precedent with the first cattle-free wilderness. He answered my question 
with another: “If you’re going to get. run off, do you want to get run off the land with 
nothing to show for it?” Certainly, the ranchers were smart enough to bend without 
breaking—survive the transitions o f a changing West and not walk away empty-handed. 
Slater stressed that despite the fact that the ranchers will have to operate in a different 
manner, they had established these ranches as economically viable units for years to 
come. “We always said, the Congressman [Walden] always said, we will not put them in 
a worse position than they are today with this.” Perhaps not a worse position, but 
certainly a different position—still intact though less powerful.
In southeastern Oregon, grazing the high country is getting more difficult and less 
profitable. Stacy Davies admitted this but said it wasn’t the only reason ranchers agreed 
to the land exchanges. “Yeah, the writing is on the wall for public land grazing in highly 
sensitive areas, and those restrictions are scaring us a little bit; but, at the same time, 
there’s quite a spirit o f cooperation in it too.” He paused and looked straight at me. 
“Quote me carefully, but you’ll never got most of these guys to admit that. They didn’t
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want development in Kiger Gorge either. That underlying land ethic, each one o f us has 
it, and we can’t really go to cattlemen’s meetings and say it. But it is there.”
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Reconciling
A good friend o f mine was once lost driving in southeastern Oregon. He recalls 
heading north out of Winnemucca, Nevada, taking a picture of himself next to a 
“Welcome to Oregon” sign, and then heading into a great unknown. Somehow, he says, 
he ended up on Highway 205. After several hours, he vaguely remembers coming to a 
crossroads: a dirt road peeled off towards the east, but he stuck to the pavement, 
assuming it would take him to Lakeview. At midday he began to wonder why he hadn’t 
arrived. The late June sun sat high, casting no shadow and providing him with little sense 
o f direction. The landscape unrolled in endless sage and plateaus. The needle on his gas 
gage hovered just above empty. He began to feel desperate. Suddenly, he crested a hill 
overlooking two large, shallow lakes. When he reached the valley floor he noticed a 
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge headquarters sign. “I have two questions,” he said 
when he walked to the front desk. “Where am I, and do you have any gas?’ The man 
chuckled, for he was still over thirty miles from the nearest gas station. Then he led him 
to a couple of huge metal gas tanks, flipped a switch, and waited for a pump to warm up. 
As it turned out, my friend’s (many) wrong turns cost him an additional five hours of 
driving. And he drove right past Steens Mountain without even knowing it.
“We’re pretty excited that we got a name long enough that you can’t put it on a 
sign with an arrow pointing down the highway,” said Stacy Davies. The name, Steens 
Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Area, implies much. It reinforces 
ranchers’ presence on the landscape, calls attention to their role in managing that 
landscape, and recognizes that protection of ecological values can exist alongside the
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existence o f historical uses. But many tourists won't know what to make of it. It has no 
precedent. It’s not a part o f any system, has no counterparts in other areas like national 
parks, national monuments, even national conservation areas. “This weird Cooperative 
Management and Protection Area—what the hell is that? It’s not a NCA,” complained 
Andy Kerr when I talked with him in Portland. “It’s not only long and awkward, it also 
suggests that Congress would be legislating an area more for a particular style o f 
management than for the substance o f conserving and protecting unique natural values 
for this and future generations,” he said while testifying to a House Resources 
subcommittee the previous July.
Compromises. Trade-offs. Were the ranchers run off? Did conservationists lose 
by giving up their dream o f 100 percent cattle-free public lands on the high mountain or 
the inclusion o f the Alvord Desert? Or, rather, did both sides have the vision and grace to 
seize a moment that might not come along again? People on either side o f the aisle are 
quick to point out objectives lost, elements carefully crafted in pervious drafts that were 
eventually discarded. It is impossible to entirely judge all o f the ramifications o f the act, 
especially since many on-the-ground details will emerge with the management plan, a 
document that will take a maximum o f four years to produce.
The legislation passed the House on the morning of October 4,2001. I was 
resting in the shade o f an old box elder by the ranch bunkhouse, reviewing interview 
notes and watching warblers and wrens, when Alice Elshoff came running down the 
driveway, clearly excited by the news she had just received. When I reached Roaring 
Springs Ranch forty minutes later and related Elshoff s ebullience, Stacy Davies smiled, 
but only a little. “If the radical environmental community is excited about it, that makes
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me nervous,” he said, though we both laughed. It was clear that passage o f the bill was a 
good thing to him—he had invested so much time in it—but it was also bittersweet.
After all o f the compromises, he felt that ranchers were left with only a few core 
consolations: “The only thing we ended up with was a 500,000-acre boundary instead of 
a 1.2 million-acre boundary. We ended up with a name that won’t draw people. And 
we’re not sure they’re really a good deal, but we ended up with the land exchanges.” Of 
course, the economic adjustments embedded in the land exchanges had to be good for the 
ranchers as well.
As we talked more about the bill, we did come across other things that made him 
happy: the Wildland Juniper Management Area, the Steens Mountain Advisory Council, 
some o f the development language. And he did speak o f a certain humility he felt when 
he watched the vote that morning on C-SPAN. “From a personal standpoint, having been 
involved in something as detailed and huge as this—to think that you’ve been that 
involved in it, and it actually went through the Untied States Congress, is pretty 
humbling, really.” But it became clear to me that the legislation was not as much as he 
hoped for; it was the lesser o f two evils. And he was not alone in this feeling. “It is 
probably an accurate sentiment in the community,” David Blackstun related, “that as the 
bill evolved, it has evolved and matured more in favor o f the environmental interests than 
the ranchers.”
The purpose statement of the act provides one overarching example o f this shift 
towards environmental protection. When the legislation was first introduced, it read as 
follows:
85
The objectives for which the Cooperative Management and Protection Area is designated 
are as follows:
(1) To maintain and enhance cooperative and innovative management practices between 
public and private land managers in the Cooperative Management and Protection 
Area
(2) To maintain the viability o f grazing and recreation operations on public and private 
lands in the Cooperative Management and Protection Area
(3) To conserve, protect, and manage the long-term ecological health and functioning 
watersheds o f Steens Mountain (U.S. House 2000b).
But environmental groups, especially national environmental groups, felt that protection
o f ecological resources had to be the guiding light for all management activities on the
mountain—in the event that any irreconcilable conflicts arose. In the final version o f the
bill, the act reads (U.S. House 2000a):
The purpose o f the Cooperative Management and Protection Area is 
to conserve, protect, and manage the long-term ecological integrity of 
Steens Mountain for future and present generations.
Then the objectives, which are subservient to the purpose, are listed in the following way:
♦ to maintain and enhance cooperative and innovative management projects, programs, 
and agreements between tribal, public, and private interests in the Cooperative 
Management and Protection Area;
♦ to promote grazing, recreation, historic, and other uses that are sustainable;
♦ to conserve, protect, and to ensure traditional access to cultural, gathering, religious, 
and archaeological sites by the Bums Paiute Tribe on Federal lands and to promote 
cooperation with private landowners;
♦ to ensure the conservation, protection, and improved management o f ecological, 
social, and economic environment o f the Cooperative Management and Protection 
Area, including geological, biological, wildlife, riparian, and scenic resources; and
♦ to promote and foster cooperation, communication, and understanding and to reduce 
conflict between Steens Mountain users and interests.
In ranchers’ eyes, the original purpose statement was more fair and balanced. Though the
list o f objectives in the final bill calls attention to and protects important, diverse
activities that occur on the mountain, it is clear that ecological integrity takes priority.
Stacy Davies explained, “I fear that the first time things get a little bit heated and
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somebody takes us to court, the judge is only going to look at the purpose, and that’s 
where he’ll stop.” Of course, that scenario is exactly what conservationists want.
Despite wins like the purpose statement, environmentalists do not claim Steens as 
a complete and decisive victory. They wanted more wilderness; they wanted all WSAs to 
become designated as wilderness. They wanted land above 6,500 feet and the entire 
Donner und Blitzen watershed cattle-free. “They have a lot of good arguments that cows 
don’t belong up there. And we took cows off 70,000 new acres, but it’s still cow country. 
That’s a big give from their dream,” commented Peter Green. During negotiations, 
environmentalists called themselves the Steens-Alvord Coalition; they wanted the Alvord 
Desert within the boundary area—the complete preservation o f a basin and range 
ecosystem, approximately 1.2 million acres. They didn’t get these things. But they did 
get quite a bit.
Some numbers: The Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection 
Area consists o f 425,550 acres o f federal land. Approximately 900,000 acres (including 
the Alvord Desert) are withdrawn from location, entry, and patent under mining laws and 
operation o f mineral leasing, geothermal leasing (one o f the biggest perceived threats on 
the Alvord), and mineral materials laws—except for the development o f minerals, such as 
a gravel pit, from existing sources for road maintenance. The act establishes the Steens 
-Mountain Wilderness Area, consisting o f 169,465 acres of federal land (including the 
recently acquired 13,833 acres ofprivate land), A N o Livestock Grazing Area of 97,071 
acres (approximately 30,000 acres were previously removed from grazing), lies within 
the wilderness boundary (U.S. House 2000a).
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Before the Steens wilderness designation, it had been sixteen years since a 
sizeable chunk o f land was set aside as wilderness in Oregon. In 1996, Senator Mark 
Hatfield helped protect about 20,000 acres o f one of the largest remaining old-growth 
tracts in the Cascades: the Opal Creek Wilderness and Scenic Area—Oregon’s last 
congressionally designated wilderness. But it was tiny in comparison to wilderness 
designations of the past. More than a million acres throughout Oregon were preserved 
when the Wilderness Act was passed in 1964 and more than 800,000 acres were 
protected in 1984 legislation (Cole 2000a). Steens Mountain brought that long, dry spell 
to an end.
New Wild and Scenic designations include the following: Kiger Creek (4.25 
miles); Wildhorse Creek (7 miles); and Little Wildhorse Creek (2.6 miles); and new 
segments o f the Donner und Blitzen Wild and Scenic River including Ankle Creek (8.1 
miles); South Fork o f Ankle Creek (1.6 miles), and Mud Creek (5.10 miles). The new 
designations bring a total o f 103.65 miles of Wild and Scenic River to the CMPA (U.S. 
House 2000a).
A Donner und Blitzen Redband Trout Preserve was created along the Donner und 
Blitzen River and the adjacent riparian areas on federal land within the wilderness area, 
above its confluence with Fish Creek. This preserve was created to protect, conserve, 
and enhance the habitat o f this endemic fish and its habitat and provide an area for 
research, education, and fish and wildlife-oriented recreation (U.S. House 2000a).
The use o f motorized or mechanical vehicles on federal land is prohibited off-road 
(though defining a road may become a sticky issue, which will be settled within the
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management plan), and no new roads will be constructed with the exception o f roads 
dedicated to public safety and environmental protection.
Other elements o f the bill fall in grayer realms. The Steens Mountain Advisory 
Committee (SMAC) is seen by some as deference to local control, or at the very least, 
local influence. Still, environmentalists and conservationists hold prominent places on 
the committee. Like BLM Resource Advisory Councils, the SMAC will be purely 
advisory; however, David Blackstun explains that the BLM will take that advice very 
seriously. “It potentially could be at our own peril to reject their advice,” he speculated. 
“There’s some hope that the SMAC, with its diverse participation, will lead us through 
some o f those minefields that might result if  they weren’t involved.” The first task o f the 
SMAC will be to help the BLM develop the management plan—a contentious and 
challenging task indeed. Consider the make-up o f its members, who will be nominated 
by various decision-makers and appointed by the Secretary o f the Interior:
> one private landowner in the CMPA, nominated by Harney County Court;
>  two persons who are federal grazing permittees on federal lands in the CMPA, 
nominated by Harney Co. Court;
> a person interested in fish and recreational fishing in the CMPA, nominated by the 
Governor;
>  a member o f Bums Paiute Tribe, nominated by the tribe;
>  two persons who are recognized environmental representatives, one will represent the 
state as a whole and one the local area, both nominated by the Governor;
> a person who participates in dispersed recreation (hiking, camping, nature viewing, 
horseback riding, etc), nominated by the Oregon State Director o f the BLM;
> a person who is a recreational permit holder or is a representative o f a commercial 
recreation operation in the CMPA, nominated by the Oregon State Director o f the 
BLM and Hamey Co. Court;
>  a person who participates in mechanized or consumptive recreation (hunting, fishing, 
off-road driving, hang gliding, etc), nominated by the Oregon State Director o f the 
BLM;
> a person with expertise and interest in wild horse management, nominated by the 
Oregon State Director of the BLM;
> a person who has no financial interest in the CMPA to represent statewide interests, 
nominated by the Governor.
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In reviewing the nominees, the Secretary is expected to consult with the community that 
the nominees are to represent to ensure that the nominees have support (U.S. House 
2000a). Before the legislation had even passed the Senate, people had contacted the 
BLM and Governor’s office, expressing interest in serving on the SMAC.
Development is another wait-and-see issue at Steens—much will be defined, 
refined, and decided in the management plan. The Governor’s office spearheaded the 
development issue during the shaping o f the legislation, though environmentalists had 
always been vehement in pointing out threats to the mountain and the need for its 
protection.
In 1997, for example, John and Cindy Witzel applied for a permit to build a lodge 
for their pack business on their 160 acres o f land on Lake Creek—a tributary o f the wild 
and scenic Fish Creek. They use the land as a base camp for their pack business and each 
season set up a temporary camp, with walls, tents, and platforms. The proposed lodge 
was a dramatic change from the previous use o f their land; it included fifteen permanent 
guest cabins, a restaurant, and gift shop. Since the land was zoned “exclusive form use,” 
the county turned them down. But in 2000, the Witzels reapplied, this time calling their 
facility a school—citing the educational components o f some o f their tours—after they 
discovered schools are permitted in “exclusive farm use” zoning. They even received a 
license from the Oregon Department o f Education to construct it. Environmentalists 
called it a “thinly veiled” proposal and warned o f a massive development in the high 
Steens that would ruin the remote and pristine nature o f the area. This issue remained 
unresolved when the Steens legislation passed. Recently, the Witzels lost their case in 
front o f the state Land Use Board o f Appeals and have petitioned the Oregon State
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Supreme Court. But Bill Marlett doesn't expect the court to hear their case. “Since then,” 
he adds, “they have applied to build a house up on Steens, which they will in turn use to 
apply as a guest lodge under a special guest ranch law in Oregon. .  . We'll see them in 
court again.”
I asked Peter Green if there were any other proposals besides the Witzels’ school 
that led the Governor’s office to believe that development was a major threat at Steens. 
“It’s not that far from California,” he said. “There’s 35 million Californians down there; 
it’s the perfect summer location. Land in that county zoning allows you to sell 160 acre 
parcels under current law without going to the county court for permission.” Green felt 
that landowners on Steens had essentially two options to make money from their land: 
graze or develop it. Taking away development would eliminate one o f those options.
And so the Governor’s office embraced the position o f “better grazing, no development.”
Kevin Smith followed up: “I’ll just start out by saying that we didn’t get 
everything we wanted on development. There are some real precedent-setting things we 
wanted to have. For instance, right o f first refusal—if someone on the mountain is going 
to sell their property beyond their immediate family, we wanted the federal government 
to have the opportunity to purchase that land. And we were told that, politically, that 
would never get through Congress. The property rights—how should I say this—the 
property rights people across the country would never let this happen.”
As it is written in the act, any development “which is different from the current 
character and uses o f the land is inconsistent with the purposes o f this Act” (U.S. House 
2000a). But what that means on the ground is a bit unclear. Green explained that a 
private landowner could put a bam or fence on his property, but he wouldn’t be allowed
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to build a Minute Mart on the loop road or a condominium development. “It gets grayer 
if  you want to build a hunting cabin on your little piece o f land and hide it down in an 
aspen grove so nobody can see it,” he said. “We’d like that not to happen, but that’s a 
very gray area.”
Andy Kerr, Bill Marlett, and even the BLM’s Miles Brown believe the law has no 
teeth, though it does provide incentives. The act authorizes the use o f $25,000,000 from 
the Land and Water Conservation Fund to fund future acquisitions within the boundaries 
of the CMPA by voluntary exchanges, donation, or purchase from willing sellers. While 
most ranchers and landowners support and prefer an incentive-based means to keeping 
the mountain free from development, others continue to worry about whether such 
incentives will be enough.
Hidden behind the high-profile controversies o f development, wilderness, and 
boundary lines is an area where ranchers and environmentalists were able to find 
common, solid ground. The act creates a 3,267-acre Wildland Juniper Management 
Area, It was created for the purposes o f experimentation, education, interpretation, and 
demonstration o f management techniques for restoration o f the historic fire regime and 
native vegetation communities (U.S. House 2000a). It is commonly agreed—by the 
BLM, ranchers, and environmentalists—that western juniper, a native species, on the 
mountain has reached unnatural levels, seriously affecting the proper functioning and 
ecology of watersheds, plant distribution, and soils. On Steens* the tree is choking out 
aspen groves and other grass and plants, which provide forage for both cattle and 
wildlife.
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According to Andy Kerr, conservationists believe the species has spread because 
o f the exclusion o f fire and the introduction o f livestock. “The ranchers tend to agree 
with the problem but not the cause,” he explained. “Conservationists were in a position 
where we needed to make sure that jumper management would be addressed fairly, 
creatively, and wisely, or we would have trouble designating additional wilderness 
areas.” Though the two sides did not agree on the motives or means o f controlling the 
species, there was general agreement for the need to address—through active 
management—the problem o f encroaching western juniper trees. Consequently, the bill 
sets up a demonstration area in order to test various management techniques and their 
effects: prescribed fire, chainsaws, handsaws, even “backpack-mounted flame-throwers 
on snowshoed fire technicians,” as suggested by Kerr. ‘Tor the record, I’d be glad to 
volunteer for such a mission,” he revealed in testimony to the House subcommittee.
The juniper demonstration area is a released Wilderness Study Area—the only 
one on the mountain. “It [the demonstration area] was originally in our very first bill. 
Then they said we could not release any wilderness study areas, period,” explained Stacy 
Davies. But the piece o f ground they wanted to use was at the perfect place—right on the 
North Loop road, where anyone can see it. And it represents a classic scenario o f juniper 
encroachment, with crowded, dying aspen clones and little ground cover. During the 
final, core negotiations, Marlett and Kerr brought the demonstration area back into the 
bill. “It’ll really work,” said Davies, smiling. “We can demonstrate how to manage 
juniper by different methods. And the general public will begin to understand why 
juniper is an issue that needs to be dealt with.”
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Such partnerships, cooperation, and common goals may have an opportunity to 
grow from this legislation. Compromise might yield innovation instead of 
disappointment. Envision Andy Kerr with a flame-thrower and Fred Otley with a 
chainsaw—facing, not each other, but a juniper tree.
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X
Hammer Over the Table: 
A Model?
Two questions arise when considering the Steens story: is the special management 
area actually better than a national monument and can the process be replicated—is it a 
model? Environmentalists started out by calling for a monument; at the time, they felt it 
was the best, quickest, and most viable option for protecting the mountain. But, as 
negotiations evolved, they discovered that legislation might just be a better option. They 
embraced and defended it in the end. Why? Wilderness might be the number one reason. 
The very fist cattle-free wilderness to be precise. Ranchers never wanted a monument; 
time and time again they spoke o f how it would ruin the remote character o f the region, 
the cooperative partnerships already formed, the management o f the landscape. But, to 
some, passing the legislation was only a matter of capturing the lesser o f two evils. They 
would have preferred things to be left as they were.
Agency staff played an important role during the negotiations by their presence at 
meetings, knowledge o f resource values, and ability to quickly produce map after map 
through GIS technology—providing a tangible portrayal o f how boundaries and 
management schemes might change with different alternatives. They had many reasons 
to encourage the legislation. Miles Brown suggested that the agency was heading 
towards gridlock on Steens; anything the BLM did on the mountain was going to end up 
in a lawsuit or appeal. “We were much more in favor o f legislation than a monument,” 
he said, “because legislation had the opportunity to resolve a lot o f the issues and make a 
lot o f calls. The more direction provided to us, the better. That’s a bureaucrat’s dream. 
Don’t leave it open-ended. Maybe in the past that was all right, but in today’s world,
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with the resource issues we have on this mountain, the tighter the direction the better.” I 
asked him if the consolidation o f public land, o f wilderness, at the top of the mountain 
would make management easier. “I don’t think it’s going to be easier,” he paused and 
then slowly grinned. “I think it’s going to be a whole new world.”
Politicians savored the opportunity to'come up with an “Oregon solution,” and 
soon touted it as such. A monument, according to Kevin Smith, could have put Steens on 
the “national travel industry radar scope” and ruined its special, remote character. 
Additionally, a monument might not be bullet proof as political power shifted over the 
years. “Who knows what’s going to happen to monuments in the future? Congress can 
deny money for implementation. There’s avenues for Congress to play havoc with 
national monuments that were designated by a president not o f the party,” Smith 
pondered. Even Stacy Davies noted that there was a chance that George W. Bush or a 
future president could overturn Clinton’s many monuments. The bipartisan legislation, 
on the other hand, would be much more difficult to change. Would the ranchers at Steens 
have been “safer in the basket with the others?” Of course, Peter Green and Kevin Smith 
did not speculate on that aspect o f the designation. They had helped craft an Oregon 
solution, and they were satisfied with its resiliency.
“How do you think this is better than a national monument, for Oregon,” I asked 
Green and Smith.
“Go ahead,” Green said to Smith and then looked back at me. “We have a long
list.”
“I think we got more land protected. We protected the local character and 
economy o f the area,” explained Smith.
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“We had some anti-development language in there which we wouldn’t have had 
at all,” added Green.
“I think a future benefit of this, frankly, is just a political one,” Smith continued. 
“The Oregon delegation and the governor have now found that with a lot o f hard work 
they can actually accomplish this kind o f feat. This was no small feat in Oregon history.”
“Would you call it precedent setting?” I asked.
“Absolutely,” answered Smith without hesitation.
“Oh yeah, for ways to protect the West,” said Green.
“Not only from an Oregon perspective and the delegation o f the Oregon political 
community, but I think, nationally, both sides are already making noises that this is a 
model that ought to be pursued,” Smith asserted.
Democratic Representative Peter DeFazio echoed Smith’s sentiment: “I believe 
this sets a precedent that will be replicated time and time again to protect other 
extraordinary places, not only in my home state o f Oregon but throughout the western 
United States” (Cole 2000a).
Democratic Senator Ron Wyden called the Steens bill “the biggest win for 
Oregon in years,” and said he would pursue a similar approach on the Oregon coast, 
within the Siskiyou National Forest. “I’m going to spend a lot o f time talking to the 
community about it,” Wyden said. “And the first question will be: Is there a Steens 
solution?” (Cole 2000a).
Republicans were not lacking in praise either.
“Well, all I can say is that I’m hearing people tell me—I heard it yesterday—that 
this is going to be a model for how to solve conflicts down the road,” said Lindsay Slater.
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“It’s a good model,” he added, especially since it recognizes that landowners are losing 
value in federal permits. “We did a good job o f compensating them for losses and 
reallocations. With all the pressure that are being brought to bear on ranchers and 
resource users, we’re going to have to come up with these novel solutions to make things 
work.”
‘I ’m just thrilled,” said Oregon Republican Senator Gordon Smith to an 
Oregonian reporter. “This is such a wonderful example for the whole country of the way 
to protect the environment without rolling the stakeholders” (Cole 2000b).
O f course, Steens is a wonderful example o f an “Oregon solution.” As Andy Kerr 
explained, there may be more “deals” like this in the future—deals in which each 
constituency gains something, deals that are not a “zero sum game.” “It’s such a deal we 
hope to replicate,” he said. But Kerr and other environmentalists warn against calling 
Steens a “model,” especially a model o f collaboration. They prefer the term negotiation, 
the idea of “cutting a deal,” and stress that without Babbitt’s threat, without that hammer 
over the table, ranchers would never have negotiated. The fear o f a national monument 
was the only impetus for them to sit down at the table. Bill Marlett claims he met with 
Representative Walden a year earlier, and the congressman essentially blew him off, 
stating there was too much wilderness, too many lock-ups in eastern Oregon already.
“All this shows is that people can come together when they’re forced to. This would 
have never happened by their free w ill. . .  The bottom line is, and Fred and Stacy have 
said this, they were choosing the lesser o f two evils. And if they had their way, they 
would have just let things be. You don’t need a solution for a problem that doesn’t 
exist.”
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But it’s wrong to assume that collaboration happens just because people
graciously decide to collaborate. Collaboration does not have to voluntary, unprovoked,
or without a mandate. It is not always a harmonious gathering of diverse interests sitting
around a table, holding hands, working through their differences, and coming up with
born-again solutions. In feet, more often than not, collaboration occurs because o f an
outside threat or pressure. Literature on the subject is replete with examples of
collaboration happening because o f an unambiguous threat or even an opportunity. In
Napa, California, a citizen coalition came up with a plan to restore and revitalize the
Napa River—and got the Army Corps of Engineers to cooperate— under a threat o f the
loss o f a $78 million federal appropriation, approved thirty years earlier (Krist 2000). In
Montana, the Northern Lights Institute Clark Fork Project occurred because o f a threat of
a contested water reservation, a case in which there would be a clear winner and a clear
loser. Collaboration would not have occurred without this legal hammer over the table
(Snow 2001). The list goes on.
Jonathan Lange writes that collaboration, often considered a voluntary process,
actually displays many paradoxes, including what he calls the “entry paradox”:
It is surprisingly difficult to find instances o f an unpressured use 
of the process. Few disputants enter mediation by spontaneous mutual 
choice. Instead, most instances involve reluctant parties entering the 
process either under strong social pressure; under pressure mobilized by 
the other disputant; or because they are required to do so by a government 
agency (Lange 2000).
He points to the example of the Applegate Partnership in Oregon, where one
environmental representative said he was there “to keep an eye on things” and make sure
nothing would happen to hurt the cause; and a timber industry representative explained
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that he was pressured to participate because he felt there was “a gun to my head and to 
the head of the whole industry” (Lange 2001).
Utah’s San Rafael Swell serves as a counterpoint to Steens. Here, there was no 
“sword o f Damocles” hanging over the collaboration table. Residents of Emery County 
had been working with federal land managers since 1995 to develop a plan to improve 
management of the swell area, an increasing popular place to camp, hike, and ride off- 
road vehicles. It also contains large areas o f pristine land that conservationists want 
protected as wilderness. Republican Representative Chris Cannon drafted a bill the set 
goals for a proposed NCA in 1998, but it was killed by Democrats. Talks began again in 
2000, and when local officials reached a compromise, many felt the bill would pass 
Congress since it had the support o f both the White House and Utah’s Republican 
leaders. Environmentalists managed to kill it, stating they were never invited to 
negotiate. Republicans said they never would have compromised anyway. Each side 
blamed the other. Some pointed out that the right dynamic just wasn’t there. After 
President Clinton’s surprise declaration o f Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument 
in 1996, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt promised there would be no more monuments 
in Utah. No threat o f a monument meant there was no rush to find common ground at 
San Rafael Swell (W oolf2000).
There were a few other places, besides Steens, where that dynamic was present.
In Colorado, Representative Scott Mclnnis called together all stakeholders in order to 
develop a proposal that would offset a national monument proclamation for an area south 
and west o f Grand Junction. The result was the 123,000-acre Colorado Canyons National 
Conservation Area, which includes 75,000 acres of formally designated wilderness
100
(W oolf2000). After the Interior Secretary visited the Cienega Creek area in southern 
Arizona, Republican Representative Jim Kolbe and Senator John McCain sponsored a 
locally developed bill (which included the participation of a regional environmental 
group) that became the 48,000-acre Las Cienegas National Conservation Area. Congress 
also passed protection for 272,000 acres in the Santa Rosa Mountains o f so utheastern 
California, championed by Republican Representative Mary Bono (Nijhuis and Brooks 
2000).
“Without Bruce Babbitt’s challenge to the governor and the delegation to find a 
new way beyond a national monument to protect this most precious place, I think it 
would be very difficult to achieve the kind o f consensus that we did achieve,” said Kevin 
Smith. Given this fact, it might seem unlikely that the process at Steens can be used as a 
cut-and-dried model. Unless, o f course, another powerful government official decides to 
provide that first spark and initiate negotiations. “That’s what is unique about this 
process,” said Bill Marlett in reference the mantle o f Babbitt ’s threat. “It almost makes it 
not worth talking about, because unless you can replicate that dynamic, you’re not going 
to get these kind of discussions going. And I could be proved wrong, may be proved 
wrong.”
But I couldn’t completely agree with Marlett. What if you set that context aside 
for a moment and focus upon another? What if you considered a context in which 
ranchers can perceive benefits in legislation that results in wilderness, and 
environmentalists can see value in legislation that might result in land exchanges or 
economic adjustments? The Steens process might not be a model, but certainly it has 
broken ground for the development of a new model for solving natural resource conflicts
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and protecting land. Bipartisan cooperation is possible. Ranchers and environmentalists 
can transcend some differences. And people, no matter how staunch and stubborn they 
may seem, should not be excluded from the table for that reason alone. In this context, it 
might not matter that people were forced to come to the table.
In another context, it is important to realize that pressures were coming to bear on 
the ranchers at Steens Mountain, even without the threat o f a monument. Undoubtedly, 
Babbitt’s sword was the sharpest point, the quickest means o f cutting through a polarized 
situation and getting people to cooperate. But in a world o f increasingly competing 
demands on natural resources—whether it be recreation or open space or wilderness 
preservation or extraction—hammers will be lifted, swords drawn, and threats uttered.
The effect of transition in the West—both economic and demographic—so visible in the 
example o f Steens, is the silver spur prodding the horse o f innovation. People may begin 
to perceive, by looking back upon examples like Steens, that coming together around the 
table and discovering innovative solutions might be the best way to protect what is dear 
to them. And they might find this protection will last a bit longer than a change in 
administration or a court ruling.
‘T’m o f the opinion that we had to have some sort o f hammer out there for this to 
happen,” explained Peter Green. “Of course, the hammer had to be in the right hands too. 
And when you consider that we have the weakest delegation in the entire Congress as far 
as total years o f seniority. And it’s a year when Congress can’t get anything done at all. 
It’s an election year, and everything was stacked against us. And yet we pulled this off 
because everybody pulled together. So, getting back to your question—well, half o f them 
came together because o f the hammer. But the hammer didn’t make the legislation. It’s
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the people coming together that made the legislation.” People who were willing to 
innovate. People who were willing to accommodate change. People, like Fred Otley and 
Stacy Davies, who have a sense of what is happening in the West and were smart enough 
to bend without breaking—to figure out how to hold onto some o f their tradition by 
pursuing untested solutions and seeking new ground. People, like Andy Kerr and Bill 
Marlett, who were smart enough to work strategically with the “other side”—to realize a 
unique opportunity had arrived that might not come around again. All o f the people who 
worked to find a solution as Steens—Republicans and Democrats, locals and nationals, 
conservationists and ranchers, politicians and agency staff—did so because o f different 
motivations. But, in the end, they did so as a sort of strange coalition fighting for a 
solution—a solution they had crafted together. That may be the key to understanding 
why the Steens Mountain legislation passed.
Of course, I cannot say all the reasons why people came together to negotiate the 
fate o f Steens Mountain. Since I was not there, the negotiations are only a story I can tell 
second-hand. But, as I learned over the course of several visits, the mountain will 
quickly give you stories o f your own. Anyone who gathers stories from a place may 
learn to love it. My own visits to Steens and the land it presides over have inscribed 
within me indelible memories— separate moments that gather and flow together like 
mountain creeks filling a desert basin. I watch a band of wild horses, mostly paints, 
grazing near the highway. Their heads are bent to earth. Their tails are blown by high 
desert winds. The bright-colored markings on their bodies cast patterns against the sage 
and juniper hills, as the mountain spills shadows on the desert floor. I walk though a long
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canyon, carved by some glacier long ago. I follow the Little Blitzen, which stalls in clear 
pools and is graced by the silver half-moons o f redband trout. The clear water is littered 
with boulders and golden coins o f aspen and cottonwood leaves. The sweet, punchy 
smell of juniper wood smoke lingers on my clothes and skin. I watch with curiosity and 
fear as Stacy Davies stands in shit and blood and afterbirth as he struggles to pull a 
newborn calf from an exhausted heifer, who has fallen to her knees. Once arrived, the 
creature struggles for breath, blowing clear bubbles from his large nostrils as he sheds the 
film of his previous world. On the refuge, I lock eyes with a tawny coyote standing on 
the opposite bank of the Donner und Blitzen. After several timeless moments, he breaks 
our gaze and casually walks away. I laugh as Fred Otley’s cattle dog tries to herd me 
back to the house and, later, pulls at my boot strings while Otley cracks me another frothy 
beer. I arise to coffee and an egg Dutch baby, light as air and lathered in syrup, prepared 
by Alice Elshoff for my last day at the refuge. As I leave, she hugs me goodbye and says 
it feels like she’s sending off one of her children.
Wendell Berry writes, “Harmony is one phase, the good phase, o f the inescapable 
dialogue between culture and nature. In this phase, humans consciously and 
conscientiously ask of their work: Is this good for us? Is this good for our place?” Steens 
Mountain is big enough to foster many different kinds of loves, many memories. That 
does not mean it has never suffered abuse or greed. Yet when I think about all the 
different people who came together because of a solitary mountain in the Oregon desert, I 
cannot help but wonder if all o f their loves, fears, and ambitions blended in a harmony, 
somehow both lyrical and discordant, particular to Steens. I wonder if others will hear it.
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